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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Circuit Judge, with whom SLOVITER, 
SCIRICA, RENDELL, AMBRO (joins Section III B of the 
majority only), SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, 
HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges join. 
 
As is so often the case, the issues in this appeal arise 
from unsettling facts presented by sympathetic plaintiffs.
1
  
We are asked to decide whether public schools have a 
constitutional duty to protect students from abuse inflicted by 
fellow students under the circumstances alleged here.  
 
Appellants, Brittany and Emily Morrow, and their 
parents, Bradley and Diedre Morrow, brought this action 
against Blackhawk School District and Blackhawk High 
School‟s Assistant Principal, Barry Balaski.2  The Morrows 
                                                 
1
  See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical 
School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1365 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), 
wherein Judge Seitz noted that such cases as this present “a 
classic case of constitutional line drawing in a most 
excruciating factual context.” 
2
  We will refer to the Blackhawk School District and 
Assistant Principal Balaski collectively as the “Defendants.” 
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claim that Brittany and her sister Emily were subjected to 
bullying in the form of a series of threats, assaults, and acts of 
racial intimidation at the hands of a fellow student and her 
accomplice.  Unable to obtain help from school officials, the 
Morrows were ultimately compelled to remove their children 
from their school.  Thereafter, the Morrows brought suit 
alleging that school officials denied them substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment by not protecting 
Brittany and Emily.  The Third Amended Complaint (the 
“Complaint”) asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and a supplemental state law claim for “negligence 
and/or gross or willful misconduct.”   
 
The District Court dismissed the Complaint based on 
our decision in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Technical School,
 
972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).  
There, we concluded that the school did not have a “special 
relationship” with students that would give rise to a 
constitutional duty to protect them from harm from other 
students given the alleged facts.  See id. at 1372 (finding that 
“no special relationship based upon a restraint of liberty exists 
here”).  The District Court also held that the injury the 
Morrows complained of was not the result of any affirmative 
action by the Defendants.  Accordingly, the court held that 
the Defendants are not liable under the “state-created danger” 
doctrine.  The District Court therefore dismissed the 
Morrows‟ Complaint, and this appeal followed.  The appeal 
was initially argued before a panel of this Court.  Thereafter, 
we granted en banc review to reexamine the very important 
questions raised by the allegations in the Complaint.   
 
We now affirm the judgment of the District Court and 
hold that the allegations do not establish the special 
relationship or the state-created danger that must exist before 
a constitutional duty to protect arises under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 




Brittany and Emily Morrow attended Blackhawk High 
School in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
3
  Beginning in 
January 2008, they were subjected to a series of threats and 
physical assaults by Shaquana Anderson, a fellow student.  
Specifically, on January 5, 2008, Anderson threatened 
Brittany by phone and on a MySpace blog.
4
  Two days later, 
Anderson physically attacked Brittany in the school‟s lunch 
room.  Pursuant to its “No Tolerance Policy,” the school 
suspended both girls for three days.  Brittany‟s mother also 
reported Anderson to the local police at the recommendation 
of Assistant Principal Balaski.  As a result, Anderson was 
charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and 
harassment.  Nevertheless, Anderson continued to bully 
Brittany and Emily.  In fact, shortly after she returned to 
school, Anderson again attacked Brittany by attempting to 
throw her down a set of stairs.  During that incident, 
Anderson allegedly called Brittany a “cracker,” told her that 
she was “retarded” and “had better learn to fight back,” and 
asked “why don‟t you learn to talk right?”   
 
On April 9, 2008, Anderson was placed on probation 
by the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Juvenile 
Division, and ordered to have no contact with Brittany.  Five 
months later, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent by a 
Juvenile Master of that court, and was again ordered to have 
no contact with Brittany.  Copies of both of these “no-
contact” orders were provided to the school and to Assistant 
Principal Balaski.   
 
                                                 
3
  Since this is an appeal from the District Court‟s grant of the 
Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we must accept the 
factual allegations contained in the Morrows‟ Complaint as 
true.  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d 
Cir. 2011).   
4
  “MySpace” is a popular social-networking website that 
“allows its members to create online „profiles,‟ which are 
individual web pages on which members post photographs, 
videos, and information about their lives and interests.”  Doe 
v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
  
5 
Despite the court‟s intervention, on September 12, 
2008, Anderson boarded Brittany‟s school bus, even though 
that bus did not service Anderson‟s home route.  Anderson 
threatened Brittany, and she elbowed Brittany in the throat at 
a school football game that evening.  A few days later, Abbey 
Harris, Anderson‟s friend, struck Emily in the throat.  These 
incidents were reported to school officials.   
 
The Morrows subsequently met with school officials, 
but they responded by telling the Morrows that they could not 
guarantee Brittany and Emily‟s safety.  Instead, rather than 
removing Anderson and her confederate from the school, 
school officials advised the Morrows to consider another 
school for their children.  In October 2008, the Morrows 
enrolled their daughters in a different school.   
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
The Morrows thereafter filed this suit pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process rights.
5
  They also 
included a supplemental state law claim against Assistant 
Principal Balaski for “negligence and/or gross and willful 
misconduct.”  The Morrows acknowledge that the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s Due Process Clause does not generally impose 
an affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from 
harm caused by private citizens.  However, they argue that 
the general rule is not applicable because the Defendants had 
a “special relationship” with Brittany and Emily.  They also 
argue that the Defendants are liable because they created the 
dangerous situation in which Brittany and Emily found 
themselves, and that circumstance gave rise to a duty to 
protect the Morrow sisters from that danger. 
 
The District Court dismissed the Morrows‟ Complaint 
with prejudice, and declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claim.
6
  In its written opinion, 
                                                 
5
  The Morrows seek: 1) compensatory damages as to all 
Defendants; 2) punitive damages as to defendant Balaski; and 
3) attorneys‟ fees.   
6
  Because the District Court dismissed the Complaint with 
prejudice, it was not necessary for the court to reach the 
  
6 
the District Court explained that we have held that there is no 
special relationship between public school authorities and 
students.  The court also concluded that the Morrows had 
“identified no action of the Defendants that utilized their 
authority in a way that rendered Minor Plaintiffs more 
vulnerable than they would have been otherwise.”  Morrow v. 
Balaski, No. 10-cv-292, 2011 WL 915863, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 16, 2011).  Although the District Court noted that it was 
“sympathetic to Plaintiffs‟ plight,” it nevertheless concluded 
that the Morrows “have not stated a cause of action under 





II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Our review of a district court‟s dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is plenary.  Great W. Mining 
& Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may 
be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in 
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff‟s claims 
lack facial plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 
643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  Although we must accept the 
allegations in the complaint as true, “we are not compelled to 
accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, 
or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff 
must allege a person acting under color of state law engaged 
in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 
                                                                                                             
issues of municipal liability and qualified immunity that the 
Defendants raised in their Motion to Dismiss.   
7
  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  
7 
806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  Accordingly, “[t]he first step in 
evaluating a section 1983 claim is to „identify the exact 
contours of the underlying right said to have been violated‟ 
and to [then] determine „whether the plaintiff has alleged a 
deprivation of a constitutional right at all.‟”  Id. (quoting 
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5 (1998)).   
 
As we noted at the outset, the Morrows‟ § 1983 claim 
rests on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Due Process Clause provides that a state 
shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
The Morrows invoke the substantive component of due 
process, which “protects individual liberty against „certain 
government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.‟”  Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  Specifically, the 
Morrows allege that school officials violated a liberty interest 
by failing to protect Emily and Brittany from the threats and 
assaults inflicted by fellow students. 
 
Like the District Court, we are sympathetic to the 
Morrows‟ plight.  Brittany and Emily were verbally, 
physically and—no doubt—emotionally tormented by a 
fellow student who was adjudicated delinquent based on her 
actions against the Morrow sisters.  When the Morrows 
requested that the Defendants do something to protect 
Brittany and Emily from the persistent harassment and 
bullying, school officials responded by suggesting that the 
Morrows consider moving to a different school rather than 
removing the bully from the school.   
 
We therefore certainly understand why the Morrows 
would conclude that the school‟s response to the abuse 
inflicted on their daughters was unfair and unjust.  
Nevertheless, our adjudication of the Morrows‟ claims must 
be governed by Supreme Court precedent.  As we shall 
explain, it is also guided by authoritative Supreme Court 
dicta.   
 
The Supreme Court has long established that “[a]s a 
general matter, . . . a State‟s failure to protect an individual 
  
8 
against private violence simply does not constitute a violation 
of the Due Process Clause.”  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 
Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).  The Due 
Process Clause forbids the state itself from depriving 
“individuals of life, liberty, or property without „due process 
of law,‟ but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose 
an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those 
interests do not come to harm through other means.”  Id. at 
195.  
 
In DeShaney, the Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services received ongoing reports from family friends 
and medical personnel that a four-year old boy (“Joshua”) 
was suffering physical abuse at the hands of his father.  At 
one point, the state obtained a court order placing Joshua in 
the temporary custody of the local hospital, but later returned 
him to the custody of his abusive father.  Following Joshua‟s 
return, the county social worker assigned to the case 
continued to document multiple incidents of suspected abuse.  
Despite these reports, the county failed to remove Joshua 
from his father‟s custody.  Eventually, the father beat Joshua 
so badly that the boy suffered permanent brain damage.  
Joshua and his mother sought redress by suing the county 
under § 1983.  They argued that the county had denied them 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by 
not protecting Joshua from his father.  Id. at 191-93.   
 
Despite these “undeniably tragic” facts, id. at 191, the 
Supreme Court held that the county‟s failure to provide 
Joshua with adequate protection against his father‟s violence 
did not amount to a substantive due process violation.  The 
Court explained that the Due Process Clause limits state 
governments but does not generally impose an affirmative 
obligation upon states to protect individuals from private 
citizens.  Id. at 195-96.  However, the Court carved out a very 
narrow exception to that general rule wherein the Constitution 
does “impose[] upon the State affirmative duties of care and 
protection with respect to particular individuals.”  Id. at 198.  
That exception has come to be known as the “special 
relationship” exception.  It applies when a special relationship 
has been established because “the State takes a person into its 




In addition to the special relationship exception, we 
have recognized that the Due Process Clause can impose an 
affirmative duty to protect if the state‟s own actions create the 
very danger that causes the plaintiff‟s injury.  See Kneipp v. 
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996).  In Kneipp, police 
officers stopped Kneipp and her husband for causing a 
disturbance on a highway while they were walking home 
from a bar, but they thereafter allowed Kneipp‟s husband to 
continue to their home to tend to their son.  Kneipp‟s husband 
later testified that because his wife was drunk, he assumed the 
officers would take her to the hospital or to the police station.  
However, the officers abandoned her despite her obvious 
intoxication, thereby forcing her to walk home alone in the 
cold.  She subsequently fell down an embankment and 
suffered hypothermia resulting in permanent brain damage.  
Id. at 1201-03.  In the subsequent suit against the state under 
§ 1983, we held that the officers‟ conduct denied Kneipp her 
Fourtheenth Amendment right to substantive due process 
because the actions of the police created the danger that 
caused her injury.  Id. at 1213. 
 
Accordingly, the Morrows can state a claim under § 
1983 if they have adequately alleged circumstances giving 
rise to a “special relationship” between their daughters and 
the Defendants pursuant to DeShaney, or if their Complaint 
adequately alleges affirmative conduct on the part of the 
Defendants to support the “state-created danger” exception 
that we adopted in Kneipp.   
 
A.  Special Relationship 
 
As the Court instructed in DeShaney, an affirmative 
duty to protect may arise out of certain “special relationships” 
between the state and particular individuals.  See DeShaney, 
489 U.S. at 197-98.  The Supreme Court has found that the 
relationship between the state and its incarcerated or 
involuntarily committed citizens is the kind of “special 
relationship” that creates an affirmative duty upon the state to 
provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners, see 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), and to ensure the 
“reasonable safety” of involuntarily committed mental 
patients, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).  
Estelle and Youngberg, “[t]aken together . . . stand . . . for the 
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proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody 
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes 
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility 
for his safety and general well-being.”  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 
199-200.   
 
It is clear from the decision in DeShaney that the 
state‟s constitutional “duty to protect arises not from the 
State‟s knowledge of the individual‟s predicament or from its 
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation 
which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own 
behalf.”  Id. at 200.  In other words, “it is the State‟s 
affirmative act of restraining the individual‟s freedom to act 
on his own behalf—through incarceration, 
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal 
liberty—which is the „deprivation of liberty‟ triggering the 
protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to 
protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other 
means.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
A minor child attending public school most certainly 
does not have the freedom of action or independence of an 
adult.
8
  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not had occasion 
to specifically decide whether that is sufficient to create a 
special relationship between public schools and their students 
under the Due Process Clause.  We have, however, previously 
considered the application of the special relationship doctrine 
in the public school context.  In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), a 
sixteen-year-old hearing and communication-impaired 
student (“D.R.”) and a seventeen-year-old classmate (“L.H.”) 
alleged that several male students physically, verbally, and 
sexually assaulted them during a graphic arts class during the 
school day over a period of several months.  The male 
students forced them into the classroom‟s unisex bathroom or 
darkroom and physically abused and sexually molested the 
plaintiffs multiple times per week.  A student teacher was 
                                                 
8
  “[T]he preservation of order and a proper educational 
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as 
well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would 
be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.”  New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). 
  
11 
present in the classroom when the abuses occurred.  Although 
D.R. did not claim to have informed her of the situation, D.R. 
alleged that the teacher either heard the assaults or should 
have heard them.  L.H. alleged that she complained to the 
school‟s assistant director about the boys‟ conduct, but he 
took no action.  Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366. 
 
Although we recognized the horrific nature of the 
allegations, we nevertheless held that “the school defendants‟ 
authority over D.R. during the school day cannot be said to 
create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it 
within the special relationship noted in DeShaney.”  Id. at 
1372.  We rejected the plaintiffs‟ argument that 
Pennsylvania‟s compulsory school attendance laws and the 
school‟s exercise of in loco parentis authority over its 
students so restrain the students‟ liberty that they can be 
considered to have been in state “custody” during school 
hours for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.  Id. at 1370-72.  
Our conclusion was largely informed by the fact that “parents 
remain the primary caretakers, despite their [children‟s] 
presence in school.”  Id. at 1371.  We explained that “[t]he 
Estelle-Youngberg type custody referred to by the Court in 
DeShaney . . . is to be sharply contrasted with D.R.‟s 
situation.”  Id.   Although the doctrine of in loco parentis 
certainly cloaks public schools with some authority over 
school children, see, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 
413-14 (2007) (reviewing legal doctrine of in loco parentis), 
that control, without more, is not analogous to the state‟s 
authority over an incarcerated prisoner or an individual who 
has been involuntarily committed to a mental facility. 
 
Nonetheless, when we decided Middle Bucks, the 
Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence allowed room to debate this 
issue because the Court had not enumerated the parameters of 
the control or custody required for the creation of a special 
relationship under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Accordingly, 
in a compelling dissent to the Middle Bucks majority, then-
Chief Judge Sloviter argued for a “functional” approach to 
“custody”:  
 
I believe that we are free to decide . . . that the 
state compulsion that students attend school, the 
status of most students as minors whose 
  
12 
judgment is not fully mature, the discretion 
extended by the state to schools to control 
student behavior, and the pervasive control 
exercised by the schools over their students 
during the period of time they are in school, 
combine to create the type of special 
relationship which imposes a constitutional duty 
on the schools to protect the liberty interests of 
students while they are in the state‟s functional 
custody.  
 
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting, 
joined by Mannsmann, Scirica and Nygaard, JJ.); see also 
Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(Seymour, J., concurring) (“I would . . . hold that a child 
legally required to attend school and thereby forced into the 
temporary day-time custody of the state‟s agents is 
constitutionally entitled to some level of protection from 
harm and care for basic safety.”). 
 
However, after our decision in Middle Bucks, the 
Supreme Court decided Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  There, the Court clarified the 
applicability of DeShaney‟s special relationship exception in 
the context of public schools.  The specific issue in Vernonia 
was whether a public school‟s policy requiring student 
athletes to submit to random drug testing violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 648.  In holding that such a policy does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted:  
“Central, in our view, to the present case is the fact that the 
subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been 
committed to the temporary custody of the State as 
schoolmaster.”  Id. at 654.  The Court then stated: “[W]e do 
not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter 
have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a 
constitutional „duty to protect.‟”  Id. at 655 (citing DeShaney, 
489 U.S. at 200).   
Although that statement is technically dictum, we have 
previously explained that we cannot lightly ignore the force 
of Supreme Court dicta.  See In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 
612-13 (3d Cir. 2000).
9
  Moreover, although the statement 
                                                 
9
  In In re McDonald, we explained: 
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was made in the context of the Court‟s analysis of a student 
athlete‟s reasonable expectation of privacy in public schools, 
the citation to DeShaney is no less pertinent to our inquiry 
because it provides insight into the Court‟s interpretation of 
DeShaney‟s application to public schools.  Indeed, short of an 
actual holding on the precise issue here, it is difficult to 
imagine a clearer or more forceful indicator of the Court‟s 
own interpretation of DeShaney and the special relationship 
exception recognized there as applied to public schools.  See 
id. (“The Supreme Court uses dicta to help control and 
influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its 
limited docket.”).  
 
In addition, every other Circuit Court of Appeals that 
has considered this issue in a precedential opinion has 
rejected the argument that a special relationship generally 
exists between public schools and their students.  See, e.g., 
Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 69-72 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Doe v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 857-58, 863 
(5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 
495, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1996); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. 
Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 268, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990); Dorothy 
J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 731-33 (8th Cir. 
1993); Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972-74 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 729-33 (10th 
                                                                                                             
[E]ven if the discussion . . . could be accurately 
characterized as dictum[,] . . . we should not 
idly ignore considered statements the 
Supreme Court makes in dicta.  . . . Appellate 
courts that dismiss these expressions in dicta 
and strike off on their own increase the disparity 
among tribunals (for other judges are likely to 
follow the Supreme Court‟s marching orders) 
and frustrate the evenhanded administration of 
justice by giving litigants an outcome other than 
the one the Supreme Court would be likely to 
reach were the case heard there. 
Id. at 612-13 (citation and internal quotation marks 




Cir. 1992); Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 568-69 
(11th Cir. 1997).
10
   
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court‟s dictum in Vernonia 
as well as the consensus from our sister Circuit Courts of 
Appeals both reinforce our conclusion that public schools, as 
a general matter, do not have a constitutional duty to protect 
students from private actors.  We know of nothing that has 
occurred in the twenty years since we decided Middle Bucks 
that would undermine this conclusion.  We therefore find the 
dissent‟s assertion here that “factual developments since 
Middle Bucks have further undercut its rationale,” Fuentes 
Dissent 18, unpersuasive.  The first two examples our 
dissenting colleagues offer of “schools exercising greater 
control over students” include the use of technology tracking 
student movement to ensure they are in class
11
 and the 
monitoring of social media activity by students.
12
  Id.  Such 
examples merely illustrate new precautionary measures some 
schools have undertaken in response to emerging technology.  
It is difficult to see how such measures constitute limitations 
on a student‟s “freedom to act on his own behalf,” see 
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, that are so severely restrictive as 
to equate public school students with prisoners or those who 
are involuntarily committed to secure mental institutions.  
 
Similarly, a school‟s exercise of authority to lock 
classrooms in the wake of tragedies such as those that have 
                                                 
10
  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not 
squarely decided this issue.  However, district courts in the 
Second Circuit have generally held that compulsory 
attendance laws do not create a special relationship between 
students and school districts resulting in a duty to protect 
against private actors.  See, e.g., Chambers v. N. Rockland 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 815 F. Supp. 2d 753, 763 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“The consensus among the courts is that the „special 
relationship‟ doctrine does not apply to the school setting.”). 
11
  Fuentes Dissent 18 (citing Maurice Chammah and Nick 
Swartsell, Student IDs That Track the Students, N.Y. TIMES, 
OCT. 6, 2012, http://nyti.ms/ThvbFq). 
12
  Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 915, 915 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
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occurred in Newtown, Connecticut and Colombine, Colorado, 
see Fuentes Dissent 18-19, may be a relevant factor in 
determining whether a special relationship or a state-created 
danger exists in those specific cases.  However, the fact that 
certain schools may resort to such restrictions does not 
advance our inquiry here or allow us to conclude that the facts 
alleged in the Complaint are sufficient to give rise to a special 
relationship or a state created danger.  
 
In arguing that we should find a special relationship 
here, Judge Fuentes cites to Judge Becker‟s statement in 
dissent in Middle Bucks that “a special relationship [between 
a public school and its students] may exist under certain 
narrow circumstances.”  Fuentes Dissent 3.  We do not 
disagree.  In holding that public schools do not generally have 
a constitutional duty to protect students from private actors 
and that the allegations here are not sufficient to establish a 
special relationship, we do not foreclose the possibility of a 
special relationship arising between a particular school and 
particular students under certain unique and narrow 
circumstances.  However, any such circumstances must be so 
significant as to forge a different kind of relationship between 
a student and a school than that which is inherent in the 
discretion afforded school administrators as part of the 
school‟s traditional in loco parentis authority or compulsory 
attendance laws.  
 
The circumstances that our dissenting colleagues rely 
upon to insist that a special relationship exists under the facts 
alleged here are not “certain narrow” circumstances at all.  
Instead, they are endemic in the relationship between public 
schools and their students.  The dissent would hold that a 
special relationship exists such that “Blackhawk undertook a 
limited obligation to keep the Morrows safe . . . because 
Blackhawk compelled school attendance, exercised extensive 
control over not only the student victims but also the specific 
threat at issue in the case—a violent bully subject to two 
restraining orders—and enforced school policies that 
prevented the Morrows from being fully able to protect 
themselves.”  Fuentes Dissent 3.  However, those factors do 
not distinguish the circumstances here from those that arise in 





As discussed above, we cannot hold that a special 
relationship arose from compulsory school attendance laws 
and the concomitant in loco parentis authority and discretion 
that schools necessarily exercise over students, or the school‟s 
failure to do more to protect Brittany and Emily, without 
ignoring the analysis in DeShaney, and the “considered dicta” 
in Vernonia School District.  In arguing to the contrary, our 
dissenting colleagues exaggerate the extent of a school‟s 
control over its students.  Judge Fuentes insists that “[t]he 
State‟s authority over children while they are in school 
extends beyond their well-being and is nearly absolute.”  
Fuentes Dissent 9 (emphasis added).  However, the mere fact 
that a school can require uniforms, 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-
1317.3, or prescribe certain behavior while students are in 
school, 22 Pa. Code § 12.2, does not suggest a special 
relationship at all.  Rather, such commonly accepted authority 
over student conduct is inherent in the nature of the 
relationship of public schools and their pupils.
13
  They do not 
suggest that a concomitant constitutional duty to protect 
students necessarily arises from that authority.   
Significantly, our dissenting colleagues do not purport 
to argue that compulsory attendance laws and the school‟s 
authority over students are themselves sufficient to satisfy the 
limited exception carved out in DeShaney.  Thus, the dissent 
attempts to characterize the specific circumstances of this 
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  Moreover, the generic responsibilities and authority 
prescribed by state law are not nearly as compelling and 
authoritarian as our dissenting colleagues suggest.  For 
example, Judge Fuentes cites 22 Pa. Code § 12.2 in arguing 
that state law requires that students “engage in conscientious 
effort in classroom work and homework.”  Fuentes Dissent 9.  
However, it is doubtful that parents or students really fear that 
the awesome authority or weight of the state will come 
crashing down upon students who do not hand in homework 
or conscientiously participate in class.  It is also not at all 
clear how the state‟s authority to require such “conscientious 
effort” restricts parents‟ ability to protect their children, or the 




case as so extraordinary and compelling that a constitutional 
duty to protect arose under DeShaney.  We are not persuaded.   
 
The fact that “the specific threat at issue in this case” 
was “a violent bully subject to two restraining orders,” 
Fuentes Dissent 3, does not necessarily give rise to a special 
relationship.  The restraining orders to which the dissent 
refers were addressed to Anderson, not the Defendants, and 
the orders themselves do not impose any affirmative duties on 
the Defendants.  Indeed, we very much doubt that any 
Defendant was a party to the proceedings that resulted in the 
orders, and no such involvement has been alleged.  Although 
the Defendants, and other third parties, are prohibited from 
making contact with the Morrow children on Anderson’s 
behalf, the no-contact orders cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as imposing any obligation on the Defendants to ensure 
Anderson‟s compliance with the orders or to otherwise 
enforce them.  Cf. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 
748, 768 (2005) (holding that police department‟s failure to 
enforce restraining order did not constitute a violation of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 
Moreover, whether our dissenting colleagues are 
referencing the school‟s “No Tolerance Policy,” or the policy 
that allegedly required Anderson‟s expulsion from school, in 
arguing that the Defendants “enforced school policies that 
prevented the Morrows from being fully able to protect 
themselves,” Fuentes Dissent 3, neither the mere existence of 
such common disciplinary policies, nor the school‟s exercise 
of discretion in enforcing them, altered the relationship 
between the school and its students to the extent required to 
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  Indeed, Judge Fuentes‟s suggestion that the school‟s “No 
Tolerance Policy” limited “the Morrows‟ ability to protect 
themselves,” Fuentes Dissent 14, is both unavailing and 
troubling.  The manner in which the school interpreted and 
enforced the policy here is certainly open to question as it 
appears Brittany was suspended for resisting Anderson‟s 
attack.  However, that does not begin to approach the kind of 
restriction on freedom required to give rise to a special 
relationship under DeShaney.  Were we to accept Judge 
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The Morrows‟ attempt to distinguish their situation 
based on the Defendants‟ “actual knowledge of Anderson‟s 
criminal conduct in this case” is similarly unpersuasive.  
They argue that such knowledge, combined with “the quasi-
custodial relationship that exists in all cases between a public 
school and its pupils,” created a special relationship for 
substantive due process purposes. 
 
DeShaney suggests otherwise.  Neither our decision in 
Middle Bucks, nor the dictum in Vernonia, necessarily 
forecloses the possibility of a special relationship arising in 
an appropriate case.  However, the Court has instructed that 
any such relationship “arises not from the State‟s knowledge 
of the individual‟s predicament or from its expressions of 
intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has 
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.”  
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.  Thus, under DeShaney, the 
Defendants‟ knowledge—of both the no-contact orders and 
Anderson‟s threats and conduct—may be relevant to 
determining whether the Defendants‟ conduct was 
sufficiently egregious to violate a previously existing duty to 
protect the Morrow children, but that knowledge cannot 
create a duty that did not otherwise exist. 
 
To find a special relationship here, our dissenting 
colleagues rely, in part, on our analysis in the foster care 
context in Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc).  See Fuentes Dissent 10.  However, we explained there 
that “distinctions between children placed in foster care and 
the prisoners at issue in Estelle or the institutionalized 
mentally retarded persons at issue in Youngberg are matters 
of degree rather than of kind.  In each of these cases the state, 
by affirmative act, renders the individual substantially 
„dependent upon the state . . . to meet [his or her] basic 
needs.‟”  Id. at 808 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372).  By “„finding the 
children and placing them with state approved families . . . , 
                                                                                                             
Fuentes‟s proposition, school policies prohibiting the carrying 
of weapons or even cellular telephones at school could 
theoretically also give rise to a constitutional duty to protect 
because such policies can also be interpreted as limiting 
students‟ ability to protect themselves. 
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the state assumes an important continuing, if not immediate, 
responsibility for the child‟s wellbeing.‟”  Id.  (quoting 
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372).
15
   
 
As we explained in Middle Bucks, unlike children in 
foster care, students in public schools continue to be primarily 
dependent on their parents for their care and protection, not 
on their school.  Despite the students‟ compulsory attendance 
in school during the school day and the school‟s authority to 
act in loco parentis during that time, the school‟s authority 
and responsibility neither supplants nor replaces the parent‟s 
ultimate responsibility for the student absent more than is 
alleged here.  Unlike foster care, the restrictions that schools 
place on students generally, and the specific restrictions 
alleged here, are different in kind from the restrictions faced 
by the prisoners at issue in Estelle or the institutionalized 
persons in Youngberg.   
 
This point is illustrated by the fact that schools 
generally may not administer medical treatment to students 
without first obtaining parental consent.  See Parents United 
for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 646 
A.2d 689, 691 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (“The principle that 
parental consent must be secured before [schools may 
provide] medical treatment . . . is time honored and has been 
recognized by both the courts and the legislature.”).  In 
                                                 
15
  The foster care cases from other circuits cited by Judge 
Fuentes also turn on the fact that the state had displaced the 
parents‟ role as primary caregiver and transferred such 
responsibility to the foster family, an agent of the state.  See 
e.g., Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 
293 (8th Cir. 1993) (“In this case, a special custodial 
relationship . . . was created by the state when it took Taureen 
from his caregiver and placed him in foster care.  . . . In foster 
care, a child loses his freedom and ability to make decisions 
about his own welfare, and must rely on the state to take care 
of his needs.  It cannot be seriously doubted that the state 
assumed an obligation to provide medical care.”); Yvonne L. 
v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 
1992) (“[I]f the persons responsible place children in a foster 
home or institution they know or suspect to be dangerous to 
the children[,] they incur liability if the harm occurs.”).  
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contrast, when a minor enters foster care, state actors have the 
authority to bypass parental consent by obtaining a court 
order authorizing medical treatment.  See 55 Pa. Code §§ 
3130.91, 3800.19(b); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6357 (stating that the 
custodian, to whom legal custody of a child has been given by 
the Court of Common Pleas under the Juvenile Act, has “the 
right to determine the nature of the care and treatment of the 
child, including ordinary medical care”).16  When a state 
agency has custody of a minor child for whom a decree of 
termination of parental rights has been entered, the agency 
acquires authority to consent to all medical examination or 
treatment, including major medical, psychiatric and surgical 
treatment of the minor even without obtaining a court order.  
See 23 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2521(c).  
 
The dissent‟s citation to Smith v. District of Columbia, 
413 F.3d 86 (D.C. Cir. 2005), is also unavailing.  In Smith, 
the court found a special relationship between the District of 
Columbia and “an adjudicated delinquent whom the District 
had, by affirmative exercise of its police power, placed with 
its agent, [an independent living program], through a court 
order revocable only by another court order.”  Id. at 94.  The 
dissent argues that “[l]ike the children in Smith, the Morrows 
were technically free to „come and go‟ from school after 
certain hours but „risk[ed] punishment‟ for „fail[ing] to obey 
[the State‟s] restrictions on [their] . . . freedom‟ while in 
school.”  Fuentes Dissent 13 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Smith, 413 F.3d at 94).  However, the fact that the juvenile in 
Smith enjoyed a degree of freedom of movement while 
housed at the independent living program is not 
determinative.  The state‟s liability arose from the fact that 
                                                 
16
  See also Lordes M. Rosado, Consent to Treatment and 
Confidentiality Provisions Affecting Minors in Pennsylvania, 
Juvenile Law Center, Jan. 2006, at 13, available at 
http://www.jlc.org/resources/publications/consent-treatment-
and-confidentiality-provisions-affecting-minors-pennsylvani 
(“As a matter of practice, upon accepting a new child for 
services, private [foster care] agencies have the child‟s 
parent/guardian sign a general release authorizing the agency 
to obtain routine medical examination and treatment for the 
child.  The private agencies in turn authorize the foster parent 
to obtain [such treatment] for the children.”).  
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the state, through court order, had removed the juvenile from 
the care and custody of his parents and required him to live 
under the care and custody of the independent living program, 
which was acting as the state‟s agent under a very detailed 
contract between the program and the state.   
 
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court expressly noted that 
“[h]ad the State by the affirmative exercise of its power 
removed [the child] from free society and placed him in a 
foster home operated by its agents, we might have a situation 
sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization 
to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”  DeShaney, 489 
U.S. at 201 n.9.  That is precisely what happened in Nicini; it 
is not what happened here.  Moreover, the Court 
acknowledged in DeShaney that “several Courts of Appeals 
have held, by analogy to Estelle and Youngberg, that the State 
may be held liable under the Due Process Clause for failing to 
protect children in foster homes.”  Id.  Citing this footnote, 
the court in Smith found that the independent living program 
there “presents a scenario close to the one described in the 
DeShaney footnote.”  Smith, 413 F.3d at 94.   
 
The dissent contends that this “focus on who remains 
the victim‟s primary caregiver . . . contrast[s] sharply with our 
holding in Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).”  
Fuentes Dissent 6 n.3.  We agree that the facts of Horton are 
instructive, but believe that they clearly counsel against 
imposing a constitutional duty here.  
 
In Horton, the owner of a nightclub suspected an 
employee, Powdrill, of burglarizing the club.  The owner and 
another employee began interrogating Powdrill about the 
burglary.  During that interrogation, Powdrill was severely 
beaten. The owner was a retired veteran of the local police 
department, 889 F.2d at 456, and the township where the club 
was located had “[a]n official policy of deferring to private 
owners with respect to the investigation of crimes in private 
clubs.”  Id. at 458.  Nevertheless, the owner did eventually 
call police.  An officer, who had served on the police force 
with the owner, subsequently arrived, but the officer left 
Powdrill alone in the owner‟s custody noting that Powdrill 
was “in good hands”—despite observing blood and evidence 
of a beating.  Id. at 456.  After the officer left, Powdrill was 
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beaten again and subsequently died from his injuries.  His 
estate brought an action against the municipality and the 
responding officer under § 1983.  We held that the township 
could be liable because the jury could have found that the 
township had “delegated . . . its traditional police functions” 
to the owner of the club.  Id. at 458.  The responding officer 
“used his official status to confirm that [the owner] was free 
to continue the custodial interrogation even though Mr. 
Powdrill was in fear for his safety and wanted to leave.”  Id.  
Although we framed the precise issue there as whether or not 
Powdrill “was in state custody at the time of the fatal 
beating,” id., our inquiry focused on whether the defendant 
had so limited Powdrill‟s ability to act in his own interest as 
to create the special relationship required for constitutional 
liability.  We explained: 
 
DeShaney requires that the state have imposed 
some kind of limitation on a victim‟s ability to 
act in his own interests. While specifically 
referring to imprisonment and 
institutionalization—the Estelle and Youngberg 
examples—the court acknowledges that other 
similar state-imposed restraints of personal 




Our finding of a special relationship in Horton also 
turned on the fact that the abuser there acted pursuant to 
delegated state authority.  
 
From the evidence the jury could find that New 
Kensington delegated to [the owner] its 
traditional police functions . . . .  [A] state can 
be held responsible for a private action if the 
private actor has exercised coercive power with 
significant encouragement, overt or covert, 
from the state.  The function of investigating 
crimes is clearly a governmental function.  An 
official policy of deferring to private owners 
with respect to the investigation of crimes in 
private clubs, which the jury could have found 
from the evidence, suffices to permit a legal 
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conclusion that [the owner], maintaining 
custody over Mr. Powdrill, was exercising a 
delegated state function.   
 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
 
The custody that the plaintiff in Horton was subjected 
to when he was fatally beaten was thus akin to the state‟s 
custody over prisoners.  The township had ceded its police 
authority to detain and interrogate to the club owner.  The 
control a school has over its students does not begin to 
approximate the restriction of freedom of movement and 
isolation from possible assistance that existed in Horton or 
other cases prescribed by DeShaney and its progeny.  
 
Despite our dissenting colleagues‟ suggestion that the 
school‟s passivity here amounted to affirmative conduct, 
there is no assertion that Anderson acted under authority 
delegated by the school or that she “exercised coercive 
power with significant encouragement . . . from” the school.  
See id.  In fact, Anderson was disciplined for her conduct.  
Although the school‟s response may well have been as 
inadequate as it was unfair to the Morrow children, the 
school certainly did not give Anderson or her confederate the 
authority to harass or bully the Morrow children. We 
therefore see no conflict between our analysis here and our 
analysis in Horton.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate that we both 
appreciate the Morrows‟ concerns and that we are 
sympathetic to their plight.  Parents in their position should be 
able to send their children off to school with some level of 
comfort that those children will be safe from bullies such as 
Anderson and her confederate.  Indeed, the increasing 
prevalence of the kind of bullying alleged here has generated 
considerable discussion and legislative action.  See T.K. v. 
New York City Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297-98 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing the problem of school bullying 
in the United States).
17
  Nonetheless, “the Constitution does 
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  See also Jackie Calmes, Obamas Focus on Antibullying 




not provide judicial remedies for every social . . . ill.”  
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).  Given the 
limitations of DeShaney, and the language in Vernonia, it is 
now clear that the redress the Morrows seek must come from 
a source other than the United States Constitution. 
 
Our dissenting colleagues take us to task for 
expressing concern for the Morrows‟ plight without providing 
a remedy and suggest that the very fact that we are troubled 
by the result counsels in favor of a constitutional remedy.  See 
Fuentes Dissent 2 (“The Morrows are today left without a 
legal remedy for these actions.  That future victims may seek 
relief from State legislatures is of no help to them.  We do not 
adequately discharge our duty to interpret the Constitution by 
merely describing the facts [of these cases] as „tragic‟ and 
invoking state tort law.”) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original); Ambro Partial 
Concurrence and Partial Dissent 1 (“I share Judge Fuentes‟ 
concern that failing to hold a school accountable for violence 
done to students creates an incentive for school administrators 
to pursue inaction when they are uniquely situated to prevent 
harm to their students.”).   
 
However, “the due process clause is not a surrogate for 
local tort law or state statutory and administrative remedies.”  
Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 1999).  Nor 
is “[s]ubstantive due process . . . a license for judges to 
supersede the decisions of local officials and elected 
legislators on such matters.”  Id.  
 
Obviously, neither our holding here nor the Supreme 
Court‟s jurisprudence forecloses states from providing public 
school students and their parents with personally enforceable 
remedies under state law.  We realize that Pennsylvania‟s 
courts have held that school districts are “the beneficiaries of 
immunity pursuant to the [Political Subdivision Tort Claim] 
                                                                                                             
l.  In light of the growing problem of school bullying, 49 
states, including Pennsylvania, see 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-
1303.1-A, have now passed anti-bullying laws.  U.S. Dep‟t of 
Health & Human Servs., Policies & Laws, 
www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 
2013).   
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Act” (now codified at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541) and are not 
subject to “tort liability . . . when students are injured in the 
course of the school day, even if, assuming arguendo, there 
was negligence on the part of the school officials.”  Auerbach 
v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 459 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1983).  However, state legislatures retain the 
authority to reconsider and change such restrictions in order 
to better respond to the kind of bullying that happened here 
and that appears to be all too pervasive in far too many of 
today‟s schools.  See T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 
779 F. Supp. 2d at 297-98. 
 
For the reasons we have explained, we cannot fashion 
a constitutional remedy under the special relationship theory 
based on the facts alleged in this case. 
 
B.  State-Created Danger 
 
 The Morrows alternatively argue that the Defendants 
had a duty to protect Brittany and Emily because they created 
or exacerbated a dangerous situation.  As we explained above, 
in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d at 1201, we first adopted the 
state-created danger theory as a way to establish a 
constitutional violation in suits brought under § 1983.  We 
confirmed that liability may attach where the state acts to 
create or enhance a danger that deprives the plaintiff of his or 
her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.  
Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1205.  To prevail on this theory, the 
Morrows must prove the following four elements:  
 
1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable 
and fairly direct;  
 
2) a state actor acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience;  
 
3) a relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant‟s acts, or a 
member of a discrete class of persons subjected 
to the potential harm brought about by the 
state‟s actions, as opposed to a member of the 




4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the 
citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted 
at all. 
 
Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
The Defendants focus on the last prong of the test.
18
  
They argue that the Morrows have failed to allege any 
affirmative action by school administrators that made the 
Morrow children more vulnerable than they would have been 
had the administrators stood by and done nothing at all.  The 
Morrows argue that the Defendants‟ affirmative act was 
suspending Anderson, and then implicitly inviting her to 
return to school following the suspension.  In other words, the 
Morrows argue that by permitting Anderson to return to 
school rather than expelling her, school officials affirmatively 
used their authority to create a danger that Anderson would 
attack Brittany and Emily once again.  The Morrows also 
point to the “affirmative act” of allowing Anderson to board 
the Morrow children‟s school bus, where Anderson 
threatened to attack Brittany.   
 
We have explained that the line between action and 
inaction is not always easily drawn.  “„If the state puts a man 
in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to 
protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely 
passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown 
him into a snake pit.‟”  Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1374 
(quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 
1982)).  However, the Morrows‟ Complaint simply attempts 
to redefine clearly passive inaction as affirmative acts.  Cf. 
Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that, where a high school guidance counselor failed 
to properly evaluate the sincerity of a student‟s comment to 
another student that he wanted to kill himself, she had not 
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  The Defendants claim that the Morrows cannot prove the 
first three prongs of the test either, but their primary focus is 
on prong four.   
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committed an affirmative act but rather failed to prevent his 
death). 
 
We are not persuaded by the Morrows‟ argument that 
the Defendants affirmatively created or enhanced a danger to 
Brittany and Emily by suspending Anderson and then 
allowing her to return to school when the suspension ended.  
Although the suspension was an affirmative act by school 
officials, we fail to see how the suspension created a new 
danger for the Morrow children or “rendered [them] more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.”  
Bright, 443 F.3d at 281.  To the contrary, the suspension 
likely made the Morrows safer, albeit temporarily.  In 
addition, the fact that Defendants failed to expel Anderson, 
or, as the Morrows would describe it, “permitted” Anderson 
to return to school after the suspension ended, does not 
suggest an affirmative act.   
 
While the Morrows make much of the fact that 
Defendants‟ failure to expel Anderson after she was 
adjudicated  “guilty of a crime” may have been contrary to a 
school policy mandating expulsion in such circumstances, we 
decline to hold that a school‟s alleged failure to enforce a 
disciplinary policy is equivalent to an affirmative act under 
the circumstances here.   
 
The dissent argues that Defendants‟ failure to expel 
Anderson constitutes an affirmative “exercise of authority” 
that contributed to the danger the Morrows faced, thereby 
triggering a duty to protect.  Under this reasoning, however, 
every decision by school officials to use or decline to use 
their authority, disciplinary or otherwise, would constitute 
affirmative conduct that may trigger a duty to protect.  The 
dissent claims that “state authority necessarily brings with it 
discretion as to whether or not to take specific actions, and 
the decision to take one action over another—or to take no 
action at all—is itself an „affirmative exercise of authority‟ 
that may carry serious consequences.”  Fuentes Dissent 24.  
Thus, were we to accept the dissent‟s formulation here, the 
state-created danger exception would swallow the rule.
 19
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  Judge Ambro also makes a very forceful point in 
expressing a concern that “creating a constitutional tort out of 
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Schools would always be liable, under the Dissent‟s view, for 
any injury that could be linked to either action or inaction.  
Any and all failures to act would be transformed into an 
affirmative exercise of authority.  
 
The Morrows also rely on the fact that the Defendants 
permitted Anderson to board Emily and Brittany‟s bus despite 
knowing about the no-contact orders against Anderson, and 
knowing that that bus did not service Anderson‟s home route.  
However, the only reasonable interpretation of that allegation 
is that the Defendants failed to take any affirmative steps to 
ensure that Anderson did not board the Morrow children‟s 
bus.
20
  Here again, the Complaint attempts to morph passive 
inaction into affirmative acts.  However, merely restating the 
Defendants‟ inaction as an affirmative failure to act does not 
alter the passive nature of the alleged conduct.   
 
As Judge Ambro explains, the requirement of an actual 
affirmative act “is not intended to turn on semantics of act 
and omission.  Instead, the requirement serves . . . to 
distinguish cases where . . . officials might have done more . . 
. [from] cases where . . . officials created or increased the risk 
itself.”  Ambro Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent 1.  
We therefore hold that the Complaint also fails to state a 
cause of action under the state-created danger exception. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
                                                                                                             
a school‟s failure to expel a student creates a too-easy 
incentive for schools to expel quickly students who engage in 
any violent behavior in order to avoid liability or the threat of 
suit.”  Ambro Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent 3. 
20
  For example, school authorities could have alerted the 
appropriate bus drivers of the no-contact orders against 
Anderson and given drivers a photograph of Anderson so they 




For all the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
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  Because the Morrows cannot make out a claim under 
either the special relationship or state-created danger theories 
of constitutional liability, we need not address whether 
defendant Balaski should be afforded qualified immunity or 




SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I join Chief Judge McKee‘s well-reasoned majority 
opinion in its entirety.  I write separately only to explain the 
limited circumstances under which I believe we may overrule 
one of our prior en banc decisions. 
 ―Stare decisis should be more than a fine-sounding 
phrase.‖  Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & 
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 394 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Yet it is nothing more than that if it does not 
require us, in the ordinary course, to adhere to a precedent 
with which we disagree.  And even sitting en banc, we do not 
conduct a plenary re-examination of our prior decisions; we 
instead remain constrained by our precedent ―to the degree 
counseled by principles of stare decisis.‖  Bolden v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 813 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc).  
Indeed, ―even in constitutional cases‖ such as this one, the 
doctrine of stare decisis ―carries such persuasive force‖ that 
departing from it has ―always required‖ some ―special 
justification.‖  Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).   
According to the Supreme Court, those justifications 
must be nothing short of ―exceptional.‖1  Randall v. Sorrell, 
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 This is not to say that courts never encounter longstanding 
precedent that must be consigned to the dustbin of history.  
The clearest example is Plessy v. Ferguson.  In Plessy, the 
Supreme Court concluded that state-mandated racial 
segregation in educational facilities could satisfy equal 
protection as long as the facilities were physically equivalent.  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).  The Court did 
 2 
 
                                                                                                             
so largely because it rejected the argument that enforced 
segregation laws were intended to ―stamp[] [blacks] with a 
badge of inferiority.‖  Id.  The next sixty years of experience, 
however, directly disproved this premise, showing that 
separate-but-equal facilities nonetheless had the effect of 
creating unequal educational opportunities based on race.  
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 
U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (―Whatever may have been the 
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern 
authority.‖).  Such experience justified—indeed, required—
the Court to correct its clearly erroneous interpretation of the 
purpose behind the enforced segregation laws and overrule 
Plessy.  See id. at 495. 
A less egregious example of precedent that was rightly 
discarded is Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co.  In Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court held that vertical price 
agreements between a manufacturer and its distributors were 
per se antitrust violations.  200 U.S. 376, 407–08 (1911).  The 
Court reasoned that such vertical agreements were 
economically analogous to unlawful horizontal agreements 
among competing distributors because vertical agreements 
always tended to restrict competition and decrease output.  Id. 
at 408.  Nearly a century later, though, the Supreme Court 
recognized the ―differences in economic effect between 
vertical and horizontal agreements, differences the Dr. Miles 
Court failed to consider.‖  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007).  With the 
―economic literature [] replete with procompetitive 
justifications‖ for vertical price agreements between 
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548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (quoting Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212).  
If its precedent‘s reasoning was clearly wrong, then stare 
decisis loses some (though not all) of its force.  See Dickerson 
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (―Whether or not 
we would agree with Miranda‘s reasoning and its resulting 
rule[] were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the 
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it 
now.‖); see also McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―Despite my 
misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original 
matter, I have acquiesced in the Court‘s incorporation of 
certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights because it is both long 
established and narrowly limited.‖ (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).  Perhaps a prior case has become 
unworkable—that is, newly discovered facts have 
undermined the case‘s reasoning, subsequent legal 
developments have unmoored the case from its doctrinal 
anchors, or ―experience has [otherwise] pointed up the 
precedent‘s shortcomings.‖  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 233 (2009); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–88 (2007).  And if the 
precedent is particularly recent and has not generated any 
serious reliance interests, the rigging controlling the sails of 
stare decisis carries additional slack.  See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010); Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793 (2009). 
 As other courts of appeals have concluded, these same 
considerations should guide our own stare decisis analysis.  
                                                                                                             
manufacturers and distributors, the Supreme Court properly 
overruled Dr. Miles.  Id. 
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United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (applying the Supreme Court‘s stare decisis factors 
in deciding whether to overrule a previous case); United 
States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); 
United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918–19 (9th Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (same); Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 310 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (same); 
Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) (same); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(same), overruled on other grounds by 535 U.S. 722 (2002); 
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., Inc., 230 F.3d 461, 467 (1st Cir. 
2000) (same), overruled on other grounds by 543 U.S. 481 
(2005); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1137–
38 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (same); McKinney v. Pate, 20 
F.3d 1550, 1565 n.21 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (same).   
None of these special justifications are present here. 
Middle Bucks‘s interpretation of the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1989), was correct at 
the time it was decided.  DeShaney held that substantive due 
process does not confer a right to state protection except 
when the state affirmatively acts to restrict a person‘s 
―freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, 
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal 
liberty.‖  Id. at 200.  In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Technical School, we interpreted ―other similar restraint of 
personal liberty‖ to require total and involuntary state custody 
with no access to private assistance.  972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (―Institutionalized persons are wholly 
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dependent upon the state for food, shelter, clothing, and 
safety. It is not within their power to provide for themselves, 
nor are they given the opportunity to seek outside help to 
meet their basic needs.  Obviously, they are not free to 
leave.‖).  We then concluded that, unlike prisoners and 
institutionalized individuals, students are not rendered totally 
dependent on the state just because the state requires them to 
attend school.  Id. 
The reasonableness of that interpretation of 
DeShaney‘s state-restraint requirement is self-evident.  To be 
sure, the Middle Bucks dissent viewed DeShaney‘s state-
restraint requirement more expansively to reach not only 
custodial restraints such as incarceration and involuntary 
institutionalization but also situations in which an individual 
faces ―substantial [state] compulsion.‖  Id. at 1379 (Sloviter, 
J., dissenting).  But compared to incarceration and 
institutionalization, substantial state compulsion is not a 
―similar restraint of personal liberty‖: a state can substantially 
compel a person without ―so restrain[ing] [his] liberty that it 
renders him unable to care for himself‖ while ―fail[ing] to 
provide for his basic human needs.‖  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 
200.  Even if, as the majority notes, ―the Supreme Court‘s 
jurisprudence [at the time of Middle Bucks] allowed room to 
debate this issue,‖ Majority Op. at 13, the very point of stare 
decisis is to forbid us from revisiting a debate every time 
there are reasonable arguments to be made on both sides.  
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (explaining that 
stare decisis reflects ―a policy judgment that ‗in most matters 
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right‘‖ (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil 
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
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concurring))).  Middle Bucks‘s reasoning was not so clearly 
wrong that we may—or should—cast it aside. 
And that is especially true when one considers the 
limited nature of en banc review.  En banc review is primarily 
reserved for correcting and maintaining consistency in panel 
decisions involving difficult and important questions of law.  
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a); see, e.g., United States v. Games-
Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (―[S]urely it 
is uncontroversial to suggest that the point of the en banc 
process, the very reason for its existence, is to correct grave 
errors in panel precedents when they become apparent . . . .‖ 
(emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v . Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 
1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc) (―The function of en banc 
hearings . . . is not only to eliminate intra-circuit conflicts, but 
also to correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly 
wrong.‖ (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).  We do not sit en banc to ―reopen settled 
issues which have already been given en banc treatment‖ 
absent intervening developments undermining our earlier 
decision.  Igartua v. United States, 654 F.3d 99, 100 (1st Cir. 
2011) (Lynch, J., concurring in the denial of en banc review); 
see also McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1565 n.21 (―[T]his is the first 
time this court sitting en banc has addressed this issue; thus, 
the implications of stare decisis are less weighty than if we 
were overturning a precedent established by the court en 
banc.‖).  Absent such exceptional intervening developments, 
the ―essence of stare decisis is that the mere existence of 
[Middle Bucks] becomes a reason for adhering to [its] 
holding[] in subsequent cases.‖  United States v. Reyes-
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Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Intervening legal and factual developments have only 
strengthened our decision in Middle Bucks.  Since then, the 
Supreme Court has sharply circumscribed substantive due 
process, limiting its protections to only those ―carefully 
described,‖ unenumerated rights that are ―‗deeply rooted in 
this Nation‘s history and tradition‘‖ and ―‗implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.‘‖  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 
760, 775 (2003) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 720–21 (1997)); see also Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third 
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (refusing to 
recognize a liberty interest protected by due process unless it 
is ―so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental‖ (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
 It can hardly be said that ―neither liberty nor justice 
would exist,‖ id., by forgoing a judicially enforceable right 
against the states to protect students from private harm.  
History points the other way.  Under the doctrine of in loco 
parentis, states have long permitted schools to exercise 
control over students on the theory that parents delegated part 
of their parental authority to the schools during the school 
day.  See, e.g., 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1317.  
―[S]choolteachers and administrators had almost complete 
discretion to establish and enforce the rules they believed 
were necessary to maintain control over their classrooms‖—
discretion that the ―judiciary was reluctant to interfere‖ with.  
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 
383, 398 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations 
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and citations omitted); see also D.O.F. v. Lewisburg Area 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 868 A.2d 28, 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2004) (noting that ―local school boards have broad discretion 
in determining school disciplinary policy‖ and that a court 
may not act as ―a ‗super‘ school board‖ by ―substituting its 
own judgment for that of the school district‖); Washington v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 481 (1982) (―No single 
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools . . . .‖ (quoting Milliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974))).  Faced with a 
tradition that once permitted almost no judicial limitations on 
schools‘ disciplinary authority, id. at 416, I cannot conclude 
that substantive due process enshrines the opposite—a right 
to judicial intervention in school disciplinary decisions.  The 
―mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that 
‗substantive due process‘ sustains it.‖ Osborne, 557 U.S. at 
72 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Just as the constriction of substantive due process has 
bolstered Middle Bucks‘s vitality, there are no new factual 
developments that undermine the decision‘s reasoning.  To be 
sure, a body of intervening research has revealed that school 
bullying undeniably causes serious harm to its victims.  This 
evidence, however, has no bearing on Middle Bucks‘s two-
part rationale.  First, the severity of harm caused by bullying 
is irrelevant to Middle Bucks‘s constitutional judgment that 
substantive due process is not triggered by substantial state 
compulsion.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (acknowledging that ―time 
has overtaken some of [Roe v. Wade‘s] factual assumptions‖ 
about when a fetus is viable and when abortions are safe for 
the mother, but concluding that these developments ―have no 
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bearing‖ on the ―soundness or unsoundness of [Roe‘s] 
constitutional judgment‖ that ―viability marks the earliest 
point at which the State‘s interest in fetal life is 
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on 
nontherapeutic abortions‖).  After all, substantive due process 
―does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing 
liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority 
causes harm.‖  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
848 (1998). 
Second, empirical revelations about bullying‘s effects 
do not change Middle Bucks‘s factual judgment that 
compulsory education laws fall short of making students 
wholly dependent on the state.  If anything, students are 
subjected to less state compulsion today than at the time of 
Middle Bucks.  With increased availability of private 
schooling, homeschooling, private tutoring, online and 
distance education, and charter schools, modern families have 
more options to satisfy the compulsory school laws. And 
school authority over students has significantly eroded in 
favor of parental control and private sources of assistance.  
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (―More 
generally, the Court has recognized that the concept of 
parental delegation as a source of school authority is not 
entirely consonant with compulsory education laws.  Today‘s 
public school officials do not merely exercise authority 
voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, 
they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and 
disciplinary policies.‖ (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).  The most serious disciplinary problems are 
handled by police officers and the legal system, not school 
administrators and the disciplinary code.  See, e.g., In re R.H., 
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791 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Williams, 749 
A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  States no longer permit 
schools to inflict corporal punishment.  See, e.g., 22 Pa. Code 
§ 12.5(a).  And so forth. 
Students these days also have the protection of state 
tort laws that did not exist when we decided Middle Bucks.  
Nearly every state has enacted anti-bullying laws since we 
decided Middle Bucks, showing that our decision has not 
prevented states from experimenting with their own solutions 
to the problems of bullying.  There is ―no institutional need to 
send judges off on [a] ‗mission-almost-impossible‘‖ to 
prevent and cure the effects of school bullying when 
legislators ―are able ‗to amass the stuff of actual experience 
and cull conclusions from it.‘‖  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3128 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gainey, 380 
U.S. 63, 67 (1965)).  ―To suddenly constitutionalize this area 
would short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered 
legislative response.‖  Osborne, 557 U.S. at 73.  If the people 
of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey and the Virgin 
Islands want to expose their schools to greater liability for 
inaction, or if they desire different solutions to the problem 
that all on this en banc court agree bullying to be, it is their 
prerogative to do so.  Middle Bucks does not stand in their 
way.   
In fact, Pennsylvania, like many other states, has 
deliberately chosen not to make schools and other local 
government agencies liable for claims like the Morrows‘.  
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 8541–42; see Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 
315 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (explaining that local state 
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agencies, including school districts, are ―given broad tort 
immunity‖ under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort 
Claims Act); Tackett v. Pine Richland Sch. Dist., 793 A.2d 
1022, 1025 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that the 
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 
immunized a school district from liability where a teacher‘s 
alleged failure to supervise students‘ chemistry experiment 
caused an explosion and severely burned a student); 
Auerbach v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 459 A.2d 1376, 1378 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding that the Political 
Subdivision Tort Claims Act immunized a school district 
from liability for student-on-student injuries, even if school 
district allegedly failed to protect the victim or supervise the 
attacker); Husser v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 228 A.2d 910, 
910–11 (Pa. 1967) (holding that a school district was entitled 
to governmental immunity for a student‘s on-campus 
mugging even if school officials knew of ―similar criminal 
acts [that had] occurred with great frequency . . . in the 
months immediately prior to the attack‖ and took no 
precautionary measures).  And of course, state law usually 
provides victims with the ability to sue and recover from 
bullies who assault, inflict emotional distress on, or commit 
other torts against fellow students and from the parents whose 
negligent care allow the bullies to do so.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 283A (discussing children‘s tort 
liability), 316 (discussing a parent‘s tort liability for 
negligently controlling his child); see, e.g., Condel v. Savo, 39 
A.2d 51, 53 (Pa. 1944) (permitting a tort action against 
parents who ―kn[e]w of the habit of their child of striking 
other children with sticks‖ and took ―no steps to correct, or 
restrain‖ the child). 
 12 
 
Lastly, even though Middle Bucks is only two decades 
old, schools have come to rely on it in developing their 
personnel and behavioral policies.  Schools have long 
operated under a regime in which they have no affirmative 
federal duty to protect students from private violence during 
the school day.  There is no reason to upset these expectations 
by imposing an amorphous, judicially created standard that 
raises more questions than it answers—especially when states 
have proven themselves capable of addressing the problem of 
bullying.  Osborne, 557 U.S. at 74 (―It is hard to imagine 
what tools federal courts would use to answer [such 
questions].  . . . [T]here is no reason to suspect that their 
answers to these questions would be any better than those of 
state courts and legislatures, and good reason to suspect the 
opposite.‖); McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3101 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (―Another key constraint on substantive due 
process analysis is respect for the democratic process. If a 
particular liberty interest is already being given careful 
consideration in, and subjected to ongoing calibration by, the 
States, judicial enforcement may not be appropriate.‖).  
Abruptly reversing course would require precisely the sort of 
―extensive legislative response‖ that stare decisis aims to 
avoid.  Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 
(1991) (noting that stare decisis ―has added force‖ when the 
legislature has relied on a previous decision in such a way 
that overruling that decision would ―require an extensive 
legislative response‖). 
It comes as no surprise, then, that Middle Bucks is no 
―legal anomaly‖ deserving of abandonment.  Randall, 548 
U.S. at 244.  Aside from the Second and D.C. Circuits, which 
have not considered the issue, all other courts of appeals have 
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held that compulsory school attendance, coupled with 
schools‘ authority over their students, does not trigger the 
protections of substantive due process.  Doe v. Covington 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 858 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); 
Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 968–69, 972–74 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Stevenson v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 3 F. 
App‘x 25, 27, 30–31 (4th Cir. 2001); Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 
175 F.3d 68, 69–72 (1st Cir. 1999); Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. 
Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 563, 568–70 (11th Cir. 1997); Sargi v. 
Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 731–34 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (involving an intellectually disabled high school 
boy assaulted by another intellectually disabled student); 
Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 728, 729–33 (10th Cir. 
1992); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 
268, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1990).  It is ―rarely appropriate to 
overrule circuit precedent just to move from one side of the 
conflict to another,‖ United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 
414 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), and no ―compelling basis‖ 
warrants our creating a conflict here where none exists, 
Wagner v. PennWest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 912 
(3d Cir. 1997) (―In light of such an array of [unanimous] 
precedent [from seven other courts of appeals], we would 
require a compelling basis to hold otherwise before effecting 
a circuit split.‖); Butler Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 780 
F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1985) (―[T]his Court should be 
reluctant to contradict the unanimous position of other 
circuits.‖).   
In short, nothing convinces me that ―adherence to 
[Middle Bucks] puts us on a course that is sure error.‖  
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911–12.  Departing from 
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Middle Bucks would create a circuit split in exchange for 
forsaking the Supreme Court‘s repeated reluctance against 
expanding substantive due process.  See NASA v. Nelson, 131 
S. Ct. 746, 756 n.10 (2011).  That, to me, is a lose-lose 
proposition.   
 1 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part 
 I share Judge Fuentes’s concern that failing to hold a 
school accountable for violence done to students creates an 
incentive for school administrators to pursue inaction when 
they are uniquely situated to prevent harm to their students.  
For that reason, as well as the others in Judge Fuentes’s 
exceptional opinion, I wholeheartedly join Part I of the 
dissent, and would hold that a special relationship exists 
between the School and its students.  
 But I cannot agree that the facts of this case 
demonstrate a cause of action under our state-created danger 
theory.  The majority concludes that the School’s decision not 
to expel Anderson is a failure to act and one that did not 
render the Morrows more susceptible to danger.  I agree, but 
think we must delve further.  Thus, while I join that part of 
the Court’s judgment, I write separately on this issue.   
 The fourth requirement of our state-created danger 
claim is that ―a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that 
rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the 
state not acted at all.‖  Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 
F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006).  This test, I believe, is not 
intended to turn on the semantics of act and omission.  
Instead, the requirement serves an important purpose: to 
distinguish cases where government officials might have done 
more to protect a citizen from a risk of harm in contrast to 
cases where government officials created or increased the risk 
itself.  Following violence, suffering, and/or death of one of 
our citizens, we often wish that a state actor with the authority 
to do so had intervened.  We are not comforted by concluding 
that officials failed to act when we could just as easily say 
that they affirmatively decided to do something.  But we are 
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limited by the protection afforded by the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court’s holding in DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (―[A] State’s 
failure to protect an individual . . . simply does not constitute 
a violation of the Due Process Clause.‖).  We have 
recognized a narrow exception to DeShaney’s rule: a 
constitutional remedy may exist when a government actor 
creates or increases the risk to a citizen.  Id. at 201; Kneipp v. 
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 Judge Fuentes makes the most compelling case 
possible: ―it may be inferred from the Complaint that the 
School did do something‖ by deciding to suspend rather than 
expel Anderson, and then continuing to keep her in school 
despite repeated acts of violence, criminal adjudication, and a 
disciplinary code that directed expulsion.  Fuentes Dissent 26.  
But the context of the School’s decision—the prior violence, 
the no-contact order, the disciplinary code, and the ability to 
protect the Morrows by expelling Anderson—are factors 
relevant to the School’s special relationship with the 
Morrows.  I do not believe we can consider these factors to 
deem the School’s behavior a creation of risk.  The School 
acted no differently in failing to protect a vulnerable member 
of society from harm than defendants in cases where no state-
created danger exists, including DeShaney.  489 U.S. at 201 
(risk of abuse suffered by four year old left in the care of his 
father was not created by social workers who had previously 
removed him and returned him to the home); Sanford v. 
Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2006) (high school 
student’s risk of suicide not caused or increased by guidance 
counselor who met with him twice); Bright, 443 F.3d 276 
(risk of attack not created by police who failed to arrest 
attacker after he violated parole).   
 Holding that the School’s actions—or lack thereof—in 
this case were sufficient to plead a state-created danger claim 
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would substantially broaden this narrow exception.  
DeShaney is grounded in constitutional law, but has an 
important practical effect too.  Federal courts cannot be the 
forum for every complaint that a government actor could have 
taken an alternate course that would have avoided harm to 
one of our citizens.  I also worry that creating a constitutional 
tort out of a school’s failure to expel a student creates a too-
easy incentive for schools to expel quickly students who 
engage in any violent behavior in order to avoid liability or 
the threat of suit.   
 The special relationship theory, which is far more 
circumscribed, does not present this same risk.  Accordingly, 
I concur in part and dissent in part.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges Jordan, 
Vanaskie, and Nygaard join, and with whom Judge Ambro 
joins as to part I, dissenting: 
 Over the course of several months, minors Brittany 
and Emily Morrow (the “Morrows”) suffered repeated 
physical and verbal assaults at the hand of a bully and her 
friend, classmates in their public school in the Blackhawk 
School District in Pennsylvania (the “School” or 
“Blackhawk”).1  The attacks included racially motivated 
assaults, verbal harassment of the Morrows in their home and 
on-line, attempting to push Brittany down a flight of stairs 
during school hours, and violent physical assaults on the 
Morrows at a School football game and on a school bus.  
Early on in this history of attacks, the bully was charged by 
the authorities with assault and making terroristic threats, was 
eventually placed on probation by the Court of Common 
Pleas, and was ordered to have no contact with Brittany.  
School officials were aware of these proceedings and had 
even suspended the bully for a brief period before she was 
                                              
1
 This appeal comes to us following the District Court‟s 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Therefore, all that is 
required is that the Complaint “contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e accept as true all allegations 
in the plaintiff‟s complaint as well as all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from them, and we construe 
them in a light most favorable to the non-movant.”  Monroe v. 
Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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placed on probation.  Nevertheless, the bully was readmitted 
to School and some of the instances of violence described 
above occurred after her return.  Eventually, the bully was 
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and was again ordered to 
have no contact with Brittany.  It also bears noting that many 
of the bully‟s attacks occurred after Blackhawk officials had 
suspended the Morrows themselves for their involvement in 
the dispute, pursuant to the School‟s “No Tolerance Policy.”  
It is reasonable to infer that, to the Morrows, application of 
the policy (which could have led to their permanent expulsion 
from the School) meant that they risked disciplinary action 
should they act to forestall attacks by the bully.  Despite all 
this, Blackhawk officials refused to protect the Morrows from 
danger.  When the Morrows sought help, they were told that 
the School would not guarantee their safety and, surprisingly, 
that their best course of action would be to find another 
school. 
 
The Morrows are today left without a legal remedy for 
these actions.  That future victims may seek relief from State 
legislatures, Majority Op. at 23-25, is of no help to them.  
“We do not adequately discharge our duty to interpret the 
Constitution by merely describing the facts [of these cases] as 
„tragic‟ and invoking state tort law.”  Doe ex rel. Magee v. 
Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 886-87 (5th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (Weiner, J., dissenting) (citing Maldonado v. 
Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 735 (10th Cir. 1992) (Seymour, J., 
concurring)).   
 
Worse, today‟s result is wrong as a matter of law.  The 
legal and factual relationship between students and school 
officials during the school day, the coercive power that the 
state exercises over school children, and the role of the school 
 3 
officials in this case in placing the Morrows in greater danger, 
all dictate a result contrary to that reaffirmed and endorsed 
today. 
 
I.  The Existence of a “Special Relationship” Between 
The Morrows And Blackhawk School Officials 
Twenty years ago, a narrow majority of this Court 
decided in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical 
School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), that school 
officials have no obligation to protect school children from 
any physical harm that may occur during school hours.  Close 
analysis of the reasoning in Middle Bucks, however, shows 
that its entire legal basis was a misunderstanding of the 
Supreme Court‟s seminal decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and of the 
relationship between the State and school children.     
   
Reconsidering the coercive power that the State 
exercises over students, and the ways in which the State may 
restrict a student and his or her parents‟ ability to protect that 
student from harm, we would conclude, like Judge Becker in 
Middle Bucks, that a special relationship may exist under 
certain narrow circumstances.  See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 
1384 (Becker, J., dissenting).  As pertains to this case, we 
would hold that Blackhawk undertook a limited obligation to 
keep the Morrows safe from harm at the hands of the bully 
because Blackhawk compelled school attendance, exercised 
extensive control over not only the student victims but also 
the specific threat at issue in the case—a violent bully subject 
to two restraining orders that victimized the Morrows over an 
extended period of time—and enforced school policies that 
 4 





As the majority outlines, in DeShaney the Supreme 
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not impose on the State of Wisconsin a 
blanket affirmative duty to interfere with the parental 
relationship between Randy DeShaney and his son Joshua, 
and that therefore the State was not liable for harm the child 
suffered or was likely to suffer at the hands of his father.  489 
U.S. at 195-96.  The Court noted that an affirmative duty to 
protect arose only if there was a “special relationship” 
between the State and the imperiled individual, and that the 
State‟s actions in taking temporary custody of Joshua and 
later returning him to his father, who was known to be 
abusive, were insufficient to give rise to such a relationship.  
Id. at 197-198.   
 
 The DeShaney Court referred to two cases that 
exemplify when a State enters into a special relationship.  In 
Estelle v. Gamble, the Court had held that the Eighth 
Amendment imposed a duty to provide “adequate medical 
care” to prisoners given that they were unable to procure such 
care on their own “by reason of the deprivation of [their] 
liberty” by the State.  Id. at 198-99 (quoting Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)).  And in Youngblood v. 
Romeo, the Court extended Estelle‟s holding to require States 
to provide “involuntarily committed mental patients with such 
services as are necessary to ensure their „reasonable safety‟ 
from themselves and others.”  Id. at 199 (quoting Youngblood 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-325 (1982)). 
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 Three years later, in Middle Bucks, we held that a 
“special relationship” did not exist between the State and 
school children, despite Pennsylvania‟s compulsory education 
laws.  972 F.2d at 1371-73.  As the majority recognizes today, 
the crux of our holding in Middle Bucks is that although the 
State exercises in loco parentis authority over children during 
school hours, the parents “remain the primary caretakers” 
over their children.  Id. at 1371.  In other words, Middle 
Bucks‟ central premise is that a student, unlike a prisoner or 
the involuntarily committed, is not subjected to “full time 
severe and continuous state restriction.”  Id. 
 
 But Middle Bucks provides no basis to conclude that 
DeShaney endorses an all-or-nothing approach that turns on 
the existence of “round-the-clock” physical custody or on 
who remained the primary caregiver.  See id. at 1379 
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).  Were the existence of either fact 
dispositive in Estelle, Youngblood, or even DeShaney itself, 
the Supreme Court surely would have said so explicitly.  
Instead, the Court explained that the common thread that 
unites Estelle and Youngblood is that a person is left “unable 
to care for himself” by the “State‟s affirmative act of 
restraining the individual‟s freedom to act on his own behalf.”  
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.  The Court contrasted these 
situations to Joshua‟s case by noting that returning Joshua to 
his father‟s care did not constitute a restraint on his liberty to 
act on his own behalf.  Id.  The result in DeShaney is also 
explained by other facts, none of which turns on the lack of 
permanent physical custody: (1) that the “harms Joshua 
suffered occurred not while he was in the State‟s custody;” 
(2) that the State “played no part in [the] creation” of the 
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danger; and (3) that the State did not do “anything to render 
[Joshua] any more vulnerable.”  Id. at 201.2 
 
Because DeShaney itself did not provide the Middle 
Bucks majority with the absolute physical custody 
requirement, it relied on our prior decision in Philadelphia 
Police to conclude that DeShaney “set[] out a test of physical 
custody.”  Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370 (citing 
Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass’n v. Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 
156, 167 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Philadelphia Police had held that 
the State is not responsible for harm suffered by mentally 
handicapped individuals living at home, but it neither requires 
absolute physical custody nor turns on who the primary 
caregiver was.  See Philadelphia Police, 874 F.2d at 167.  
                                              
2
 Moreover, the duty assumed in Estelle was commensurate 
with the restriction the State had imposed on the individual‟s 
liberty: a prisoner is restrained from seeking medical help on 
his own, so under Estelle the State must provide it.  
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 
103-104).  Estelle does not recognize a generalized duty to 
protect prisoners from all harm, despite the fact that prisoners 
are under the permanent physical custody of the State.  And 
the only gloss on Youngblood provided in DeShaney was to 
note that because the mentally committed were less culpable 
than the incarcerated and “may not be punished at all,” the 
State takes upon itself a duty, broader than in Estelle, to keep 
such individuals safe.  Id. at 199 (citation omitted). This 
analysis suggests that the Court favored a more nuanced look 
at the relationship between the individual and the State, 




Indeed, the case arguably implies that the State could be held 
liable for harm suffered by the individual while in temporary 
State custody.  To be sure, Philadelphia Police and DeShaney 
foreclose any argument that the State is responsible for the 
safety of school children while in their own homes.  But 
Philadelphia Police does not bridge the gap between 
DeShaney and an “absolute physical custody” requirement.  
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 Middle Bucks‟ absolute physical custody requirement and its 
focus on who remains the victim‟s primary caregiver also 
contrast sharply with our holding in Horton v. Flenory, 889 
F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).  In Horton, we held that a special 
relationship existed between the employees and the 
proprietors of a nightclub, who had been delegated law 
enforcement authority by the local police, and that there was a 
duty to protect an employee from harm while he was in the 
temporary physical custody of the owners.  Id. at 458.  
Although we sat en banc in Middle Bucks, the Middle Bucks‟ 
majority‟s failure to address Horton‟s interpretation of 
DeShaney is significant.  “[R]eturning to the intrinsically 
sounder doctrine established in prior cases may better serve 
the values of stare decisis.”  Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  We do 
not suggest that there is a “conflict” between today‟s analysis 
and Horton.  See Majority Op. at 23.  Horton merely 
illustrates that Middle Bucks‟ absolute physical custody 




 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he State exerts 
great authority and coercive power through mandatory 
attendance requirements.”  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 584 (1987).  Reexamining the relationship between 
school children and the State in light of our understanding of 
DeShaney leads to the inescapable conclusion that a special 
relationship may exist under certain specific circumstances. 
 
In Pennsylvania, attending school is obligatory for 
children between the ages of eight and seventeen.  24 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 13-1326, 1327(a).  Parents who fail to comply with 
these mandates face punishment as severe as imprisonment.  
Id. §1333(a)(1).
4
  Once the State compels attendance, it has 
considerable power over the child‟s well-being as a matter of 
both law and fact.  Pennsylvania‟s in loco parentis statute 
gives school officials “the same authority as to conduct and 
behavior over the pupils attending . . . school . . . as the[ir] 
parents.”  Id. § 13-1317.  And “[t]he rights and liabilities 
arising out of an in loco parentis relationship are . . . exactly 
the same as between parent and child.”  T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 
A.2d 913, 916-17 (Pa. 2001).  This may be an 
understatement.  A parent may punish a child for 
“incorrigibility,” but he may not, like the State, initiate 
juvenile delinquency proceedings.  24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-
1338.      
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 The State‟s first intrusion into the lives of its citizens in the 
school context may be considered to be when it enrolls all 
parents as the funders of public schools via taxation.   
 9 
It is true that parents retain the ultimate legal custody 
and responsibility over the child.  But a parent‟s immediate 
ability to protect his child is significantly curtailed during the 
time the child is in the physical custody of school officials.  
During that time, the State may well be the only caregiver to 
which children may turn to for help.  Middle Bucks attempted 
to dilute the strength of this reasoning by noting that it cannot 
“be denied that a parent is justified in withdrawing his child 
from a school where the health and welfare of the child is 
threatened.”  972 F.2d at 1371 (quoting Zebra v. Sch. Dist. of 
Pittsburgh, 296 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. 1972)).  But this 
overlooks that this right is extremely narrow, limited to 
situations in which a child‟s safety is “positively and 
immediately threatened.”  Commonwealth ex rel. Sch. Dist. of 
Pittsburgh v. Ross, 330 A.2d 290, 292 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1975).  In Ross, a parent could not withdraw a student 
although the child had been pushed into a wall and cut with 
scissors by other students.  Id. at 291.  And in Zebra, a parent 
could not withdraw his child even though he was threatened 
with physical harm “if any reports were made to the school 
authorities” regarding a bully‟s extortion attempt, and 
“[m]any of the . . . students became ill, developed nervous 
conditions, required medical treatment, [and] were afraid 
while attending [the school].”  Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh v. 
Zebra, 287 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972), order 
reversed by Zebra, 296 A.2d 748.  Thus, a Pennsylvania 
parent appears not to be free to withdraw a child absent the 
most egregious conditions.  Indeed, “[m]ost parents, 
realistically, have . . . little ability to influence what occurs in 
the school.”  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
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The State‟s authority over children while they are in 
school extends beyond their well-being and is nearly absolute, 
covering what they may wear and how they may behave.  See 
generally 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1317.3; 22 Pa. Code § 12.2 
(detailing student responsibility to engage in “conscientious 
effort in classroom work and homework”).  Officials may 
“proceed against said child before the juvenile court” for 
misbehavior.  24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1338.  At thirteen, the 
child is also subject to penalties for failure to comply with 




The Blackhawk Student Handbook reflects these 
restrictions on students‟ liberty and on their parent‟s ability to 
act on the child‟s behalf, and goes further by regulating 
student conduct in classrooms, school buses, cafeterias, and 
sporting activities; providing that students missing class will 
be required to attend the School for detention on Saturdays 
and that officials “may consider corporal punishment” upon a 
student; and prohibiting students from having cell phones.  
See Blackhawk High School Student Handbook “Statement of 
Student Behavior,” available at 
http://blackhawk.bhs.schoolfusion.us/modules/cms/pages.pht
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 That these measures are “inherent in the nature of the 
relationship of public schools and their pupils,” Majority Op. 
at 16, is of no moment.  See also id. at 15.  Restrictions on 
liberty are also “inherent” in the relationship between the 
State and the imprisoned or involuntarily committed, but the 
significance of such restrictions is not diminished by the fact 




ml?pageid=41593 (hereinafter “Handbook”); see also 24 Pa. 




In DeShaney, the State simply left Joshua where it 
found him; he was not harmed while in the State‟s physical 
custody or by anyone or anything over which the State had 
any immediate authority.  Here, by contrast, the State 
affirmatively removed the children from their parents‟ 
custody for a period of time, limited what both the children 
and the parents could do respecting the children‟s safety 
during that period, and exercised control over a continuous 
threat the children faced over an extended period of time.   
This is enough to hold that a special relationship existed 
between the School and the Morrows.  But if more were 
needed, one may look at cases involving the special 
relationship between the State and children it places in foster 
care. 
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 Given the prohibition against students carrying means of 
communicating with their parents during school hours, which 
in 1992 represented a ban on pagers, it is obviously difficult, 
if not practically impossible, for a student to seek help from a 
parent during school hours.  Middle Bucks largely overlooked 
this.  972 F.3d at 1372 (noting that “channels for outside 
communication were not totally closed” during school hours).  
Contrary to the majority‟s suggestion, we do not question the 
wisdom of school policies aimed at student safety or 
discipline, see Majority Op. at 17 n.14, and we doubt schools 
will change any policies to avoid liability under the narrow 
circumstances described here.  But we look to those policies 
to better understand the nature of the relationship between 
students and the State. 
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Since Middle Bucks, several Courts of Appeals have 
answered the question left open by the Supreme Court in 
DeShaney regarding the existence of a special relationship 
between the State and the children it places in foster homes.  
See 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.  These courts have held that a special 
relationship exists in such cases because the State, in placing 
a child in foster care, “renders the individual substantially 
dependent upon the state . . . to meet [his or her] basic needs.”  
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lintz v. 
Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 305 (6th Cir. 1994); Norfleet v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 
(10th Cir. 1992).  
 
Our own case, Nicini, involved a child who was not in 
the State‟s absolute care but was placed in a foster home.  The 
child‟s parents had signed a foster care placement agreement 
with the State, and the State permitted the child to stay on a 
temporary basis with another family, the Morras, after the 
child ran away from home.  The child sued the State on the 
theory that it had failed to sufficiently investigate the Morras, 
whom he alleged sexually abused him.  Although we 
“recognize[d] that the analogy between foster children . . . 
and prisoners and institutionalized persons” from Estelle and 
Youngblood was “incomplete,” and that foster children “enjoy 
a greater degree of freedom and are more likely to be able to 
take steps to ensure their own safety,” we held that a special 
relationship existed because the child was effectively in State 
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custody and was “substantially dependent” on the State for 




Nicini thus “discredit[s]” not just the “underlying 
reasoning” of Middle Bucks, but also its reading of DeShaney.  
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(explaining that “stare decisis does not control” when the 
“underlying reasoning” of precedent in question has been 
“discredited”).  Nicini makes clear that physical custody 
cannot be the lynchpin of a DeShaney special relationship 
because the child there was not under the State‟s control at 
the time the harm occurred.  Moreover, the State in Nicini 
was not the primary caregiver.  As the D.C. Circuit has 
recognized, the result and reasoning in the foster care cases 
have thus created “tension [with the] public school cases” 
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 Middle Bucks places some emphasis on the fact that schools 
do not restrict a child‟s ability to provide for his basic needs, 
see Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372, but this is not the proper 
rubric of analysis under DeShaney.  The State did not restrict 
the individual‟s ability to provide for his basic needs in 
Youngblood or in the foster care cases.  The individual‟s 
ability to do so was restricted by circumstances over which 
the State had no control and in which it played no part.  At 
most, the State undertook some responsibility when it stepped 
into the lives of such individuals.  So too in the school 
context.  Minors are unable to provide for their basic needs 
without their parents on account of age.  By compelling 
attendance in school, the State does not alter that reality, but 
does temporarily curtail a parent‟s ability to be a caregiver, 
thereby undertaking that responsibility—albeit a more limited 
one—in the same way it does in Youngblood and Nicini. 
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because “[b]oth involve state constriction of a child‟s liberty 
. . . yet only the former triggers DeShaney custody.”  Smith v. 
District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  And 
Smith itself demonstrates that the fact that children return to 
their parents at the end of the school day is not dispositive.  
There, the Court held that a State has a special relationship 
with juvenile delinquents the State places in an “independent 
living” youth program, but over which it exerts neither 
absolute physical control nor supervision.  See id. at 94.
8
 
     
Moreover, not only do these cases provide reason to 
revisit the legal underpinning of Middle Bucks, they provide 
further support for holding that a special relationship exists in 
this case.  Here, unlike in Nicini or DeShaney, the State had 
custody of the children at the time of the injury in question, 
and the children were “substantially dependent” on the State 
for their safety during school hours, despite the existence of 
other caregivers.  Nicini, 212 F.3d at 808 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Like the children in Smith, the Morrows were 
technically free to “come and go” from school after certain 
hours but “risk[ed] punishment” for “fail[ing] to obey [the 
State‟s] restrictions on [their] . . . freedom” while in school.  
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 Indeed, even though a student returns home after the school 
day, the State may continue to exercise some control over 
some of the student‟s activities.  See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(addressing propriety of school action under the First 
Amendment).  If students have a cause of action under § 1983 
against school administrators who attempt to discipline them 
for out-of-school internet postings as we held in J.S., then 
surely students also have a cause of action against school 
administrators who fail to protect them from in-school harms.   
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Smith, 413 F.3d at 94.  If anything, the existence of a special 
relationship is clearer here than in Nicini because the State in 
this case had physical custody over both the victim and the 
aggressor and was thus uniquely positioned to protect the 
child from harm.  Neither factor existed in Nicini or in 
DeShaney.  Fairly read, the additional element of control that 
existed in the relationship between the State and Nicini that 
did not exist in DeShaney is that in Nicini the State entered 
into a temporary agreement with Nicini‟s parents pursuant to 
which the parents consented to have their son placed in foster 
care.  More is present here.  Compulsory schooling laws, 
together with the restrictions on parents‟ and their children‟s 
ability to free themselves from State control, arguably impose 
on the State a greater obligation here than that which it 
undertook in Nicini. 
 
 The majority seizes on the temporary nature of the 
student/State relationship and also attempts to distinguish 
Nicini and Smith on the ground that parents remain the 
primary caregivers over school children.  But this fact does 
not negate that during school hours the State has the 
“immediate [] responsibility for the child‟s wellbeing.” 
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 808.  In our view, this fact demonstrates, 
at most, that the difference between the State‟s relationship 
with the Nicini children and schoolchildren is a difference in 
degree, not kind, and suggests that the proper course is to 
impose a constitutional duty on schools only under limited 
circumstances.  See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1384 (Becker, 
J., dissenting).  In Middle Bucks, Judge Becker found the 
existence of a special relationship based on the state‟s 
compulsory attendance laws, the student‟s disability, and the 
“affirmative steps [the school took] to confine the student to 
situations where she was physically threatened.”  Id.  Under 
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the circumstances before us—Pennsylvania‟s compulsory 
schooling laws, the existence of the restraining orders that 
prohibited contact between the bully and the Morrows, the 
fact that the School had custody and control over the very 
threat that harmed the Morrows, and the enforcement of the 
“No-Tolerance” Policy, all suggesting that the Morrows‟ 
ability to protect themselves was limited—we “have no 
difficulty deciding” that a special relationship arose between 
the School and the Morrows.  Id.   
 
Restrictions on a person‟s liberty to protect him- or 
herself from danger are the lynchpin of DeShaney.  See 489 
U.S. at 199-201.  An approach that abandons Middle Bucks‟ 
doctrinally unsound requirements and focuses on whether a 
State substantially restricted a student‟s ability to defend 
herself from a particular danger, in addition to the general 
restraints on liberty imposed by compulsory schooling laws, 
is therefore more in line with DeShaney and simply makes 
more sense.  Adopting such an approach and considering the 
specific circumstances of this case, we would hold that the 
Complaint has adequately pled the existence of a special 
relationship between the Morrows and the School vis-à-vis 
the bully, and remand the case for discovery on that claim.
9
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 I would also note that, in the school context, children are 
placed under State control for the undeniably important goal 
of “prepar[ing them] for citizenship in the Republic.”  Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) 
(citation omitted).  This restraint on the liberty of students is 
justified by the State‟s own overarching interest in education. 
   
In addition, if it is unconstitutional to confine in unsafe 




Today‟s majority does not quarrel with the foregoing 
or fully reject the dissenters‟ reasoning in Middle Bucks.  
Majority Op. at 11-12 (instead calling the Middle Bucks 
dissent “compelling”).  Nevertheless, the Court refuses to 
revisit Middle Bucks, asserting that the matter has been settled 
by dictum in a decision of the Supreme Court.  But neither 
that comment nor principles of stare decisis preclude us from 




In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme 
Court upheld under the Fourth Amendment a school policy 
requiring athletes to submit to drug tests.  The Court relied on 
the lowered expectations of privacy that students have in 
schools, because they are “committed to the temporary 
custody of the State.”  515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).  The Court 
commented that it did not mean to “suggest that public 
schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over 
children as to give rise to a constitutional „duty to protect.‟” 
Id. at 655 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).  Seizing on this 
language, the majority concludes that “it is difficult to 
                                                                                                     
unconstitutional to refuse to protect from harm school 
children whose liberty the State restricts on its own accord.  
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 (“If it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, 
it must be unconstitutional . . . to confine the involuntarily 
committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe 
conditions.” (citation omitted)).   
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imagine a clearer or more forceful indicator of the Court‟s 
interpretation of its holding in DeShaney.”  Majority Op. at 
13. 
 
But the Vernonia dictum cannot bear the great weight 
the majority places on it.
10
  Simply put, this case is not a 
“general matter.”  Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.  The School 
administrators here had custody of a bully, who was 
prohibited from contact with Brittany Morrow by two court 
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 That is particularly true because much of the dicta in 
Veronia that both precedes and follows the language quoted 
by the majority points in the opposite direction.  In framing 
the degree of control that public school officials exercise over 
their students, the Court began with the premise that 
“unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental 
rights of self-determination—including even the right of 
liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at 
will.”  515 U.S. at 654.  The Court also noted that it had 
“rejected the notion that public schools . . . exercise only 
parental power over their students,” a “view of things” that it 
said is “not entirely consonant with compulsory education 
laws.”  Id. at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).  And the 
Court “emphasized[] that the nature of that power is custodial 
and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control 
that could not be exercised over free adults,” id.,  following 
its passing reference to DeShaney with a recitation of the 
various ways in which “school authorities ac[t] in loco 
parentis” and a statement that the nature of constitutional 
freedoms enjoyed by students “is what is appropriate for 




orders.  Despite the State‟s knowledge of a very specific, 
continuing, and serious threat against a particular student, the 
School failed to prevent subsequent attacks and instead took 
action against the victims themselves pursuant to the “No 
Tolerance Policy.”  When faced with a specific request for 
help, the School told the Morrows that it could not offer 
assistance, and even suggested it would be best if they, not 




To be sure, we do not “lightly ignore” Supreme Court 
dicta, Majority Op. at 13, and the Vernonia dictum 
undoubtedly “invites some caution,” Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 
175 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 1999).  But we also ought not to 
stretch dicta beyond the specific question it controls, so as to 
curtail constitutional rights.  While the Vernonia dictum 
precludes us from holding that school districts have as “a 
general matter” a duty to protect students, it does not 







Nor do we lightly suggest that our precedent be 
overturned.  But even assuming that the same stare decisis 
concerns that cabin the Supreme Court‟s discretion to revisit 
its own precedent apply with equal force to the Courts of 
                                              
11
 Notably, one of the decisions by our sister Circuits cited by 
the majority specifically refuses to read the dictum in 
Vernonia to preclude finding a special relationship in the 
school context under all circumstances.  See Hasenfus, 175 
F.3d at 71-72. 
 
 20 
Appeals, those principles do not stand in the way of revisiting 
Middle Bucks. 
 
We should revisit Middle Bucks because its underlying 
premise, that the special relationship test turns on the 
existence of permanent physical custody, was clearly 
erroneous and set our jurisprudence astray from the contours 
of the special relationship test.  See supra Part I.A.  The fact 
that the majority does not defend the outcome of Middle 
Bucks as standing on its own suggests that the decision 
remains sufficiently controversial as to counsel “a greater 
willingness to consider new approaches capable of restoring 
our doctrine to sounder footing.”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
at 922 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Even the Supreme Court, 
when it “has confronted a wrongly decided, unworkable 
precedent calling for some future action  . . . [,] ha[s] chosen . 
. . to overrule the precedent.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 842-43 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
12
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 Moreover, Middle Bucks has been subject to criticism.  See, 
e.g., Deborah Austern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: 
Placing an Affirmative Duty of Protection on Public Schools 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 
183, 196 (1995) (denouncing “mechanical” analysis of the 
relationship between students and school officials, and 
suggesting that we should “make case-by-case, fact-intensive 
inquiries into state action”); Robert C. Slim, Comment, The 
Special Relationship Doctrine and a School Official’s Duty to 
Protect Students from Harm, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (1994); 
Case Comment, Third Circuit Finds No Affirmative Duty of 
Care by School Officials to Their Students: D.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1224 (1993).   
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In addition, although the record before us on this 
question is bare, one might also argue that at least some 
factual developments since Middle Bucks have further 
undercut its rationale and provide additional reasons to 
reexamine it.  The proper question is whether Middle Bucks‟ 
assumptions about the level of control that schools exert over 
students have been challenged.  There are now abundant 
examples of schools exercising greater control over students, 
ranging from technology tracking student movements at all 
times to ensure they are in class, see Maurice Chammah and 
Nick Swartsell, Student IDs That Track the Students, N.Y. 
TIMES, OCT. 6, 2012, http://nyti.ms/ThvbFq, to monitoring 
online social media activity within and outside school 
premises, see, e.g., J.S.., 650 F.3d at 915, and, in the wake of 
recent tragic school shootings, locking classrooms in further 
restriction of student movement.  See, e.g., Stephen Ceasar 
and Howard Blume, To lock classroom doors or not?, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, http://soc.li/2N96T3f (noting 
increase in locked classrooms in the wake of the Newtown, 
Connecticut shootings, and how such measures have resulted 
in other problems such as an instance of a teacher sexually 
assaulting students).
13
  Stare decisis does not require us to 
                                              
13
 We do not contend that the limitations on students‟ 
freedoms are comparable to those imposed on prisoners or the 
involuntarily committed.  See Majority Op. at 14-15.  The 
examples do show, however, that the relationship between 
school children and the State is far more intrusive than the 
relationship between Joshua DeShaney and the social services 
department, and that in some ways the relationship restricts 
the freedom of students, as a factual matter, more so than the 
relationship between the State and the children in Nicini and 
Smith. 
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definitively settle the questions raised by these new 
circumstances, nor does it preclude us from revisiting Middle 
Bucks while sitting en banc.   
 
II. Blackhawk May Have Also Created the Danger 
That Harmed The Morrows  
 
The Morrows also argue that the School may be liable 
under the “state-created danger” theory.14  The majority 
concludes that this cause of action must also be dismissed 
because the Morrows have failed to plead an “affirmative act” 
by the School.  Majority Op. at 26-27.  Although we have 
acknowledged that “the line between action and inaction may 
not always be clear” in the context of these kinds of claims, 
Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 
2006), the consequence of that line becomes sadly clearer 
with the Court‟s decision in this case: administrators who let 
violence run rampant can take shelter under the label 
“inaction.”  Dereliction of duty becomes a school‟s best 
defense.  This outcome is contrary to an appropriate 
understanding of the state-created danger doctrine.  Indeed, 
although the doctrine represents a narrow exception to 
DeShaney, the majority narrows the exception to the 
vanishing point by saying that school officials are free to 
ignore court orders and their own disciplinary code, enabling 
a pattern of physical abuse to persist. 
                                              
14
 We and other Circuits derived this theory from the 
Supreme Court‟s statement in DeShaney that “[w]hile the 
State may have been aware of the dangers that [plaintiff] 
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation.”  
489 U.S. at 201.   
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 To prove a state-created danger, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that:  
 
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable 
and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a 
degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; 
(3) a relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant‟s acts, or a 
member of a discrete class of persons subjected 
to the potential harm brought about by the 
state‟s actions, as opposed to a member of the 
public in general; and (4) a state actor 
affirmatively used his or her authority in a way 
that created a danger to the citizen or that 
rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger 
than had the state not acted at all.  
Id. at 281 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  The first 
and third elements are not in dispute in this case.
15
  We 
therefore discuss the second and fourth elements to 
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 The first prong is satisfied by the two court orders directing 
the bully to have no contact with the Morrows, which were 
delivered to the School, because the threat posed by the bully 
was both “foreseeable” by the School and “fairly direct” as to 
the Morrows.  The third prong is satisfied because the 
assignment of the Morrows to Blackhawk under the 
compulsory school attendance law made them part of a 
“discrete class of person subject to the potential harm” 
brought about by the School‟s conduct.   
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demonstrate that the Morrows‟ complaint adequately pleads 






The second prong of the state-created danger test sets 
“deliberate indifference” as “[t]he level of culpability 
required to shock the conscience . . . in cases where 
deliberation is possible and officials have time to make 
unhurried judgments.”  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 309 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).  The “deliberate 
indifference” formulation applies here because the decision 
with respect to the bully and the Morrows was neither “split-
second” nor made in a “matter of hours or minutes,” id. at 
310 (citation omitted), but rather was made and sustained 
over eight months stretching from January to October 2008. 
   
 In addition, the Complaint here supports an inference 
of deliberate indifference on the part of the School principal, 
Balaski.  Balaski knew that the bully was not permitted to 
contact the Morrows.  Moreover, the Handbook mandates 
some action by officials in response to students who commit 
“Level IV” offenses, which include assault and battery, and 
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 Because, as noted, this case comes to us from a ruling on a 
motion to dismiss, we must draw all reasonable inferences in 
the Morrows‟ favor.  Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205.  If, based on 
the facts pled in the Morrows‟ Complaint, “we cannot 
reasonably conclude at this juncture of the case that the harm 
. . . came about by means apart from the state,” Middle Bucks, 
972 F.2d at 1382 (Sloviter, C. J., dissenting), the Morrows 
should have the opportunity for discovery to determine the 
precise nature of the School‟s conduct. 
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arguably calls for their expulsion.  However, Balaski ignored 
the import of the no-contact orders and decided not to abide 
by the school‟s own Disciplinary Code.  His decisions are 
alleged to have put the bully in proximity to and contact with 
the Morrows, despite ample reason to believe the bully would 
continue to assault the Morrows.  Consequently, they have 
adequately pled deliberate indifference and satisfied the 




 Under the fourth prong of the theory, “liability . . . is 
predicated upon the states‟ affirmative acts which work to the 
plaintiffs‟ detriment in terms of exposure to danger.”17  
                                              
17
 It is worth noting that DeShaney does not actually compel 
the inclusion of the “affirmative act” requirement into the 
fourth element of the state-created danger test.  When we first 
considered the state-created danger theory, we said that 
DeShaney holds “that a state‟s failure to take affirmative 
action to protect a victim from the actions of a third person 
will not, in the absence of a custodial relationship between the 
state and the victim, support a civil rights claim.”  Brown v. 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990).  
However, DeShaney used the phrase “affirmative act” only to 
refer to state conduct sufficient to create a special 
relationship.  See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.  By 
contrast, in contemplating the possibility of a state-created 
danger, the Court simply suggested that the State must have 
“played [some] part” in the creation of that danger.  Id. at 
201.  Much like the requirement that the State have absolute 
physical custody in the context of the special relationship test, 
the “affirmative act” element is our own addition, and one 
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Bright, 443 F.3d at 282 (quoting Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 
1374).  But it is not easy to discern from our cases what 
constitutes an affirmative act and what does not. 
 
In Kneipp v. Tedder, we held that there was a 
substantive due process violation when police stopped an 
intoxicated couple on the street and then permitted the wife to 
go home alone, resulting in her fall down an embankment and 
ultimate death.  95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1996).  Then, in 
Rivas v. City of Passaic, we held liable emergency medical 
technicians (“EMTs”) who told police officers that a man in 
the midst of a seizure had assaulted them but did not inform 
the officers of the man‟s medical condition.  365 F.3d 181, 
195 (3d Cir. 2004).  We said that the state had created a 
danger in Kneipp because the defendants “used their authority 
as police officers to create a dangerous situation or to make 
[the victim] more vulnerable to danger [than] had they not 
intervened.”  95 F.2d at 1209.  In Rivas, we aggregated an 
earlier action (the EMTs‟ call that brought the police) with 
the inaction that was the actual cause of harm (the failure to 
inform the police of the victim‟s condition) and decided it 
was sufficient because such sequence “created an opportunity 
for harm that would not have otherwise existed.”  365 F.3d at 
197.   
 
 As these cases demonstrate, virtually any action may 
be characterized as a failure to take some alternative action or 
vice-versa.  See, e.g., Covington Cnty., 675 F.3d at 864, 866 
(describing the police officers in Kneipp as having “sent” the 
victim home alone, but recasting parents‟ allegation that a 
                                                                                                     





school released their child to an unauthorized person in 
violation of school policy as a “failure to adopt a stricter 
policy”).18   
 
Moreover, any conduct pled as the source of a state-
created danger is likely to include a combination of action 
and inaction, depending on how far back in the causal chain a 
court goes.  See Bright, 443 F.3d at 291 (Nygaard, J., 
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 We also struggled with the “action/inaction” determination 
in Middle Bucks when we distinguished two cases in which 
the state indisputably created a danger by a failure to act.  The 
first case was Horton, where a club owner empowered by the 
police to act as law enforcement beat up one of his employees 
while interrogating him about an alleged theft.  The club 
owner then called a police officer who failed to remove the 
employee from the club owner‟s custody, despite evidence of 
severe physical mistreatment.  We held that the police officer 
was potentially liable.  See Horton, 889 F.2d at 458.  In the 
other case, a minor was committed to a foster home based on 
a charge of assault and battery upon her father.  The state later 
learned, but failed to disclose, the fact that the parents had 
fabricated the assault charge.  The First Circuit held that the 
state was liable because its failure to disclose the false charge 
resulted in continued custody of the daughter in foster homes 
and other placements.  See Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9 (1st 
Cir. 1989).  We distinguished those cases from Middle Bucks, 
in which we held that a failure to act did not support a state-
created danger claim, because we “read both cases to turn 
upon a finding of „functional‟ custody,” 972 F.2d at 1375, 
that we believed did not exist in Middle Bucks, but we 
provided no justification for that distinction. 
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dissenting) (“By cabining Bright‟s claim based solely on an 
ensuing delay in taking action, the majority lops off the initial 
affirmative act so it can conclude that there was no 
affirmative act.”).  Indeed, in Kneipp and Rivas, the 
immediate harm to the victims was due to the defendant‟s 
failure to act.  Therefore, the better way of understanding 
these cases, contrary to the majority‟s embrace of the 
“affirmative act” requirement today, is to recognize that “the 
dispositive factor appears to be whether the state has in some 
way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position that was 
foreseeable, and not whether the act was more appropriately 
characterized as an affirmative act.”  Morse v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 915 (3d Cir. 1997).
19
 
                                              
19
 Given that, as noted, the “affirmative act” requirement is 
not actually present in DeShaney, it is not surprising that we 
have not always required an “affirmative act” as part of the 
fourth prong of the state-created danger test.  As Judge 
Nygaard noted in Bright, “[s]ince Kneipp . . . enunciated our 
state-created danger test, not one of our cases [had] inserted 
the word „affirmatively‟ into the fourth element of the test” 
prior to Bright.  443 F.3d at 288 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).  
Rather, we consider whether “the state actor used his 
authority to create an opportunity for danger that otherwise 
would not have existed.”  Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208; see 
generally Bright, 443 F.3d at 288 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases).  Judge Nygaard rightly observed in Bright 
that these cases “shifted away from inquiring into the 
existence of affirmative acts as a standard to establish the 
fourth element of our test for a compelling reason: to so hinge 
our inquiry would center us squarely in the troublesome 
decisional thicket governing the distinction between action 
and inaction.”  Bright, 443 F.3d at 289.   
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 The majority in Bright suggested that there is “no 
conflict” between the “use of authority” and “affirmative act” 
formulations of the fourth prong of the state-created danger 
test because “state actors cannot use their authority to create . 
. . an opportunity [for injury to the plaintiff] by failing to act.”  
443 F.3d at 283 n.6 (quotation marks omitted).  But that 
statement is wrong both linguistically and logically.  It is 
wrong linguistically because authority is a broader concept 
than action.   See Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 639-40 
(3d Cir. 2007) (treating “affirmative action” as a specific 
instance of the “exercise of authority”).  And it is wrong 
logically because state authority necessarily brings with it 
discretion whether to take specific actions, and the decision to 
take one action over another—or to take no action at all—is 
itself an “affirmative exercise of authority” that may carry 
serious consequences.  In many, if not most, state-created 
danger cases, the state actor will have made a decision to act 
in the context of some set of policies.  For example, police 
departments have procedures with respect to the enforcement 
of restraining orders, and their enforcement decisions must be 
viewed in the context of those policies.  See, e.g., Sheets v. 
Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 2002) (considering 
sheriff‟s liability in the context of court-mandated process for 
restraint orders); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (considering whether police chief interfered with 
standard police procedures with respect to enforcement of 
restraint order). 
 
 The exercise of authority by school officials must 
similarly be viewed in the context of policies and procedures 
whose express purpose is to protect students while they are 
under school control.  If a school exercises its authority to 
contravene a policy designed to protect students, then “the 
 30 
school officials‟ role [is] not merely passive or simply 
negligent.”  Covington Cnty., 675 F.3d at 882 (Wiener, J., 
dissenting).  It cannot rightly be said of a school‟s decision to 
exercise its authority to violate or suspend a policy that would 
protect a student that “it placed [that student] in no worse 
position than that in which he would have been had [the state] 
not acted at all.”20  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.  As we said in 
Middle Bucks, “[i]f the state puts a man in a position of 
danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it 
will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is 
as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a 
snake pit.”  972 F.2d at 1374 (citation omitted).  The 
majority‟s argument that our view of the state-created danger 
exception threatens to “swallow the rule,” Majority Op. at 26, 
ignores the key role played by school disciplinary policies, as 
well as other policies that cabin officials‟ discretion, in our 
formulation of the state-created danger exception.   
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 One might argue that holding public schools liable under 
the state-created danger theory based on their own protective 
policies creates an incentive to eliminate or weaken those 
policies.  However, those policies are typically mandated by 
the State.  For example, Pennsylvania requires that each 
school “adopt a code of student conduct that includes policies 
governing student discipline.”  22 Pa. Code § 12.3(c).  Also, 
under its “Safe Schools” statute, Pennsylvania requires each 
school to have a policy relating to bullying that must be 
incorporated into its code of student conduct and disciplinary 
code.  24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1303.1-A(a).  Moreover, we 
doubt that any rational school district will opt for eliminating 
policies designed to protect children, and permit teachers to 
abandon children to danger, simply to avoid liability in 
egregious cases such as this. 
 31 
 
 Ultimately, the misguided effort to equate “affirmative 
act” and “exercise of authority” begs the real question at 
issue: whether a state actor increased the risk someone faced.  
Regardless of whether a state-created danger requires either 
an “affirmative act” to place an individual in danger or an 
“exercise of authority” that renders him more vulnerable to 
danger, the facts pled in the Complaint, accepted as true, 
together with the reasonable inferences we are required to 
draw, satisfy either standard.   
 
While the majority reasons there was no affirmative 
act on the part of the School, it may be inferred from the 
Complaint that the School did do something.  Principal 
Balaksi engaged in decision-making as to the implementation 
of a provision of the Disciplinary Code.  The Disciplinary 
Code states that Level IV offenses “are clearly criminal in 
nature and are so serious that they always require 
administrative action resulting in the immediate removal from 
school.”  Compl. ¶ 16 (emphasis added).  Therefore, it may be 
reasonably inferred that the School affirmatively exercised its 
discretion to permit the bully to return to school after she was 
adjudicated a delinquent and made the subject of the two no-
contact orders.  Moreover, the School conceded at oral 
argument that the principal could have initiated the hearing 
process that would have been necessary prior to permanently 
expelling the bully from the School, but that he did not do so.  
Consequently, it is fairly inferable from the Complaint that 
there were internal discussions that preceded the decision to 
decline enforcement of the Disciplinary Code against the 
bully.  Those discussions, and that decision, put the Morrows 
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at a heightened risk of harm and satisfy the fourth element of 




The majority‟s conclusion to the contrary turns on its 
assumption that the bully would have continued to attend 
school had she not been suspended.  See Majority Op. at 26-
27.  But this is plainly incorrect in light of the Disciplinary 
Code that obligated School officials to do something about 
the bully‟s continued criminal behavior after her return from 
school.  Without explanation, the majority “decline[s] to hold 
that a school‟s alleged failure to enforce a disciplinary code is 
equivalent to an affirmative act.”  Id. at 27.  Precisely 
because, in choosing to ignore that mandate, the School 
officials contributed to the danger the Morrows faced, we 




 Like Kneipp, this case presents “unique facts,” 95 F.3d 
at 1208, that distinguish it from Middle Bucks and set it apart 
from the majority of state-created danger cases that we have 
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 One might also reasonably infer that the School officials 
affirmatively acted in a way that increased the danger to the 
Morrows by putting them and the bully in the same lunch 
room or allowing the bully to board the Morrows‟ school bus 
despite the fact that it did not serve her home route.  See, e.g., 
Compl.  ¶ 18.  The School argues that the incident on the 
school bus cannot constitute the basis of liability because the 
Morrows were less restrained by the School when they were 
on the bus.  This argument confuses the physical restraint 
component of the special relationship test with the state-
created danger theory. 
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seen.  In Middle Bucks, where the question was “extremely 
close,” 972 F.2d at 1374, we held that, “[a]s in DeShaney, 
„the most that can be said of the state functionaries . . . is that 
they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances 
dictated a more active role for them.‟”  Id. at 1376 (quoting 
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203).  But the high school principal 
here, Balaski, was not confronted with “suspicious 
circumstances.”  He was confronted with a student who had 
been charged with assault and making terroristic threats and 
harassment, had been adjudicated a delinquent, had 
repeatedly attacked the Morrows over the course of several 
months, and had been the subject of two no-contact orders 
that were delivered to the School.  And Balaski‟s 
decisionmaking did not occur in a vacuum but instead 
operated under a Disciplinary Code and an Anti-Bullying 
Policy that the School was required to adopt by the 
Pennsylvania legislature.  See supra note 20.   In Middle 
Bucks, we said that the defendants “did not subject plaintiffs 
to an inherently dangerous environment,” 972 F.2d at 1375, 
but, here, Balaski‟s decision not to expel the bully 
unquestionably subjected the Morrows to an inherently 
dangerous environment.  This is evidenced by his own 
statement to the Morrows‟ parents that the school “could not 
guarantee the safety” of their daughters.  Compl. ¶ 20.  The 
Morrows should therefore be permitted to take their state-




It has been suggested that the “elephant in the room” 
in cases of this nature is a desire by the federal courts to avoid 
becoming the forum for all disputes involving everyday 
schoolyard quarrels.  See, e.g., Middle Bucks, 972 F.3d at 
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1384 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting); Oral Arg. Audio Tr. 26:39-
27:08 (Ambro, J.).  But there exist sufficient evidentiary and 
procedural protections to assuage any concerns that a limited 
review of Middle Bucks will open the floodgates to all school-
related litigation.  See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1384 
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).  And to plead a plausible special 
relationship cause of action, the student must clear another 
hurdle by pointing to other circumstances beyond the 
restraints imposed ordinarily by compulsory schooling laws.  
Run-of-the-mill schoolyard fights, isolated or random acts of 
violence, or matters where a school played no part in 
exacerbating the threat, would likely not be covered. 
 
But regardless of the efficacy of these devices, we 
ought not refuse to grant relief that is warranted simply to 
stem future litigation.  While turning away the Morrows may 
be convenient as a matter of management of judicial 
resources or as a matter of school policy, it is neither 
expedient nor sound as a matter of constitutional law.  The 
majority avers that students and concerned parents may seek 
redress from their legislatures, but concedes that the law as it 
exists today, at least in Pennsylvania, immunizes schools 
from such suits.  See Majority Op. at 25 (citing Auerbach v. 
Council Rock Sch. Dist., 459 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1983)).  Perhaps students may seek redress under other 
federal statutes for certain instances of pervasive or race-
motivated harassment.
22
  But these limited remedies will not 
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 See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 
(2d Cir. 2012) (permitting cause of action to proceed against 
school district under Title VI for permitting plaintiff to be 
bullied on account of race); Shore Regional High Sch. Bd. of 
Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing claim 
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be available for all cases, and we should not require that the 
level of attacks reach frightening extremes before school 
officials are required to intervene.  “When claims like these 
fall through the cracks, § 1983 seems less than the powerful 
tool to vindicate constitutional rights it was designed to be.”  
Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 715 (3d Cir. 
1993) (Scirica, J., concurring). 
 
Most ironically, today‟s victory may be pyrrhic for 
school officials.  To the detriment of schools‟ ability to 
manage their own affairs, concerned parents could seek 
greater control and awareness over the moment-to-moment 
safety of their children, knowing that the school officials to 
whom they entrust their children are under no legal obligation 
to protect them from harm.  Some parents may even take 
unilateral acts to protect their children.  See, e.g., Ryan 
Raiche, Parents of boy who brought butcher knife to school 
say it was to defend himself from bullies, ABC Action News 
WFTS-TV, Jan. 14, 2013, http://shar.es/jEG8P.  At worst, 
schools may be unwittingly encouraging the law of the jungle 
to be the reigning norm.  We hope this is not the case. 
 
It cannot be denied that schools both create and 
regulate the conditions to which students are subject during 
the school day.  When a State interrupts even temporarily the 
                                                                                                     
against school based on the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act).  Notably, the existence of alternative causes 
of action further undercuts implicit reliance on a desire to 
shield school officials from suits as a reason to depart from 
sound constitutional principles.  Bullying-related suits will 
continue as long as the issue is in the public eye regardless of 
today‟s decision. 
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provision of care by a parent to a child, steps into the shoes of 
that parent, and restricts the ability of the child to defend 
herself from a specific threat, the State ought to be seen as 
incurring a narrow, concomitant responsibility to act as one 
would expect the child‟s parents to act: to protect the child 
from that danger.  The School‟s explicit refusal to do so 
should give us more pause than it does today.  Moreover, 
when a school official chooses not to remove a student who 
has committed violent acts against another student, despite 
policies that call for such removal, that official has surely 
placed the victim in a worse position than if the disciplinary 
policy had run its ordinary course.  And when a school 
creates an atmosphere in which serious violence is tolerated 
and brings no consequence, it acts in a manner that renders all 
students more vulnerable.   
 
We respectfully dissent. 
 1 
 
Nygaard, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 More than twenty years ago, we took up the troubling 
appeal of two female high school students who had been 
sexually assaulted by seven male students in a classroom, 
during a graphic arts class.  See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical School, et al., 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Despite compulsory education laws, we held that 
schools do not have an affirmative constitutional duty to 
protect students from the actions of third parties while they 
attend school.  Id. at 1371-72. 
 
I joined several of my colleagues in dissenting from 
that decision.  Id. at 1377 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).  I believed 
then that the Appellants had stated viable constitutional 
claims against the school district.  My position has not 
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 My colleague, Judge Fuentes, has also written an opinion in 
dissent, which I agree with in toto and join. 
 
